Mozambique

The eight sectoral scenarios as well as their relationship to the Current Path and the Combined scenario are explained in the Technical page. Chart 10 summarises the approach.

Chart 11 presents the mortality distribution in the Current Path for 2023 and 2043.

The Demographics and Health scenario envisions ambitious improvements in child and maternal mortality rates, enhanced access to modern contraception, and decreased mortality from communicable diseases (e.g., AIDS, diarrhoea, malaria, respiratory infections) and non-communicable diseases (e.g., diabetes), alongside advancements in safe water access and sanitation. This scenario assumes a swift demographic transition supported by heightened investments in health and water, sanitation and hygiene (WaSH) infrastructure.

Visit the themes on Demographics and Health/WaSH for more detail on the scenario structure and interventions.

There are strong interactions between population and health. A country’s health status influences fertility, mortality, and morbidity. At the same time, high population growth increases the demand for basic necessities of life, such as nutrition and health.

Despite efforts to improve Mozambique’s public health sector, it remains one of the least resourced in the world, which has negatively affected the GoM's ability to improve its population's healthcare. As a result, Mozambique has some of the worst healthcare statistics in the world. In 2019, the country ranked 184th for overall health efficiency among 191 World Health Organisation (WHO) member states, with a low score of 0.26 out of 1.0. 

The country has a ratio of only three doctors per 100 000 people, a proportion that is among the lowest in the world. Systems for tracking, motivating and retaining staff are weak, and frontline health providers are often poorly trained and have limited management skills. For those in rural areas and the extremely poor, women, adolescent girls and children, quality healthcare is very unsatisfactory and hard to reach, exposing health system inequalities between genders and geographic regions.  

Mozambique spends relatively less on healthcare compared to its peer countries, although health expenditure has been on an upward trend since 2014. According to WHO data, Mozambique allocated about 6.8% of its total government expenditure to healthcare in 2023, a slight decrease from 7% in 2022.

The efficiency of a country’s health system can be assessed through indicators such as maternal mortality, infant mortality and life expectancy. Mozambique has made notable progress in reducing mortality rates and expanding access to primary health services. In 2023, the country recorded 99 maternal deaths per 100 000 live births, lower than the average for low-income African countries (331) and Southern Africa regional peers (162). The Sustainable Development Goal target for maternal mortality (SDG 3.1) is to reduce maternal mortality to fewer than 70 deaths per 100 000 live births by 2030. On the Current Path, Mozambique is likely to meet this target, with maternal mortality projected to decline to 64 deaths per 100 000 live births by 2030 and 42 by 2043.

Chart 12 presents the infant mortality rate in the Current Path and in the Demographics and Health scenario, from 2020 to 2043.

In 2024, Mozambique’s infant mortality rate remained among the highest in low-income African countries, at 44.7 deaths per 1 000 live births. The SDG target is to reduce infant mortality to below 25 deaths per 1 000 live births by 2030. On the Current Path, Mozambique is unlikely to meet this target, with the infant mortality rate projected to decline to 37 deaths per 1 000 live births by 2030 and 22.7 deaths per 1 000 live births by 2043. While this represents substantial progress over the long term, the 2030 level will remain above the SDG target, although the 2043 forecast would fall below the GoM’s target of 35 deaths per 1 000 live births in the same year.

Low life expectancy and high infant mortality in Mozambique are closely linked to the high prevalence of communicable diseases, which impose significant human and economic costs. In 2024, the death rate from communicable diseases in Mozambique stood at about 4 per thousand, which was 7.2% higher than the average for low-income African countries (3.8 per thousand) and 4% higher than the average of its regional peers (3.9 per thousand). This comparatively high disease burden highlights ongoing limitations in healthcare access, disease prevention, and treatment capacity.

The cohort death rate distribution shows that most premature deaths in Mozambique occur in the early stages of life and are heavily skewed toward communicable diseases. Premature mortality in Mozambique is concentrated largely in the early stages of life and is predominantly driven by communicable diseases. Higher mortality among infants and children not only reflects poor health conditions but also undermines the accumulation of human capital, potentially constraining the country’s long-term economic growth. Even in the working age groups, communicable disease deaths dominate. In particular, AIDS represents the largest health burden among individuals aged 30–44 and 45–59. High mortality within these cohorts reduces the working-age population, dampens productivity, limits human capital development and raises fiscal pressures on the healthcare system.

Much of the communicable disease burden for infants and children aged 1 to 4 years is the result of a lack of health infrastructure. The use of traditional fuel sources (i.e., coal, dung) is a core driver of childhood pneumonia and other respiratory infections. Lack of health facilities for malaria testing and treatments, and low bed net use contribute to Mozambique’s high malaria burden.   Meanwhile, poor water and sanitation access are a core driver of communicable disease deaths (such as diarrhoea) for children under five years of age. This high communicable disease prevalence in children under five years of age can also lead to undernourishment and stunting.

The prevalence of malnutrition has remained high in Mozambique, with 38% stunting and 6% wasting among children under five years of age. Around 209 250 children aged 6-59 months suffer from acute malnutrition, and 72 199 cases of acute malnutrition in pregnant (or lactating) women were recorded between May 2023 and March 2024. On the Current Path, the stunting rate of children under five years of age will decline to 25.1% by 2043, about 14.9 percentage points above the GoM target rate in the same year in the National Development Strategy (2023-2043).

In the older age cohort (60-69 years), the disease burden shifts toward non-communicable diseases, such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes and cancers. This shift reflects Mozambique’s gradual epidemiological transition, a point at which death rates from non-communicable diseases exceed those of communicable diseases. This transition has important implications for Mozambique’s healthcare system. Managing this dual burden will require expanded investment in healthcare infrastructure, improved capacity for chronic disease management and stronger preventive health systems. 

Strengthening disease prevention efforts, improving access to healthcare services and reinforcing public health systems will therefore be essential to improving population health and supporting Mozambique’s long-term economic development.

Chart 13 presents the demographic dividend in the Current Path and in the Demographics and Health scenario, from 2020 to 2043.

The dividend is the window of economic growth opportunity that opens when the ratio of working-age persons to dependants increases to 1.7 to 1 and higher.

The Demographics and Health scenario aims to improve health and expand the demographic dividend. It consists of reasonable but ambitious reductions in child and maternal mortality, increased access to modern contraception and reductions in the mortality rate associated with both communicable diseases (e.g. AIDS, diarrhoea, malaria and respiratory infections) and non-communicable diseases (e.g. diabetes), as well as improvements in access to safe water and better sanitation.

If the Demographics and Health scenario is implemented, Mozambique could accelerate its demographic transition to reap the demographic dividend by 2047 (Chart 13), seven years earlier than under the Current Path. Generally, the demographic dividend materialises when a country reaches a ratio of at least 1.7 working-age people for each dependent.

Chart 14 presents crop production and demand in the Current Path from 1990 to 2043.

The Agriculture scenario envisions an agricultural revolution that ensures food security through ambitious yet feasible increases in yields per hectare, thanks to improved management, seed, fertiliser technology and expanded irrigation. Efforts to reduce food loss and waste are emphasised, with increased calorie consumption as an indicator of self-sufficiency and prioritising it over food exports. Additionally, enhanced forest protection signifies a commitment to sustainable land use practices.

Visit the theme on Agriculture for our conceptualisation and details on the scenario structure and interventions.

Mozambique has significant untapped agricultural potential, with 45% of its land arable, yet only 16% is currently cultivated. The country’s strategic geographic position allows it to play an important role as an entrepot for agricultural trade with its neighbouring landlocked countries.

The agriculture sector is the mainstay of Mozambique's economy. It accounts for over a quarter of its GDP and employs 80% of the workforce. The majority of agricultural output comes from smallholder farmers, who account for approximately 3.2 million individuals and contribute 95% of the nation's agricultural production, while the remaining 5% is attributed to commercial farming enterprises.

Maize and cassava are the main food staples and are grown by 80% of all Mozambican smallholders. Other important staples are wheat and rice. Animal production, particularly poultry and small ruminants, holds significant importance in rural livelihoods and nutritional sustenance. In urban settings, formal meat outlets rely heavily on beef and poultry, supplying over 80% of the meat demand. The limited number of commercial farmers focus on cash crops such as tobacco, cotton, cashew nuts and sugar. The volatility of commodity prices and fluctuations in global markets considerably impact Mozambique's commercial agriculture and overall economic landscape.

The potential has not translated into production. Mozambique has one of the lowest average crop yields per hectare in Africa. With an estimated 3.4 tons per hectare in 2024, the country ranked 26th out of 55 African countries and had the 5th-lowest crop yields in Southern Africa in 2024. On the Current Path, the average crop yields per hectare in Mozambique will marginally increase to 4.5 tons by 2043, below the estimated average of 6.5 tons for Southern Africa but slightly above the average of 3.8 tons for low-income countries in Africa.

The low agricultural productivity in Mozambique stems from various factors, including limited access to agricultural finance and improved inputs, slow adoption of technology, insufficient agricultural services and reliance on rain-fed farming coupled with vulnerability to climate hazards.

Mozambique ranks as the third most vulnerable African country to climate change, facing threats such as tropical cyclones, droughts and coastal flooding. Its extensive coastline, spanning 2 700 km, exacerbates this vulnerability, particularly for the 60% of the population residing in low-lying coastal regions. These areas face risks to infrastructure, coastal agriculture, ecosystems and fisheries from intense storms and rising sea levels, with repercussions felt inland as well. Between the period 1980–2019, Mozambique experienced a total of 53 natural disaster events, comprising 21 tropical cyclones, 20 floods and 12 drought occurrences. According to the Global Climate Risk Index, Mozambique was the most affected country in the world by the impacts of extreme weather events in 2019 and the fifth most affected when considering the period 2000–2019.

Disasters further impede access to markets, compounding challenges for rural producers heavily reliant on climate-sensitive agriculture for sustenance and income. In addition to being among the most vulnerable countries regarding natural disasters, Mozambique is among the least prepared countries for these climatic hazards, ranking 154th out of 185 nations on the Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN).

Moreover, inadequate road infrastructure poses a significant obstacle to agricultural development; it hinders the establishment of essential linkages along value chains and impedes the adoption of modern technologies crucial for enhancing productivity, such as fertilisers, pesticides, improved seeds and mechanised equipment. They increase transportation costs, hampering farmers' access to both domestic and international markets. Our interviews conducted during the fieldwork found that food importers in Maputo prefer to import from South Africa rather than from the local production zones because it can take a week to bring produce from these areas to Maputo due to poor road conditions.  

Compared to many developing countries, the GoM's support for the agriculture sector is high, although the recent period has seen a slow decline in public spending on agriculture. The average share of agriculture in the national budget  was above 4% from 2010 to 2014 and fell to 4% in the subsequent five-year period (2015–2019), less than half of the 10% target recommended by the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). 

The low agricultural productivity is unable to meet the nutritional demands of the growing population. Many rural farmers remain net food consumers and vulnerable to increases in food prices. As a result, the nutrition situation in the country remains precarious, with about 43% of children under five suffering from chronic undernutrition. In 2022, the Global Food Security Index ranked the country at the lower end (94 out of 113 countries), with particularly low scores in food quality, safety, and affordability.

Going forward, climate change will exacerbate their frequency and intensity in Mozambique. Feeding the growing population under such conditions will be one of the country's biggest challenges. In 2024, an estimated 19.1 million metric tons of crops were produced, a significant increase from the 5.1 million metric tons produced at the end of the civil war in 1992. On the Current Path, crop production will increase to about 27.5 million metric tons by 2043, while crop demand is set to increase from 22.1 million metric tons in 2023 to about 42.5 million metric tons by 2043, causing a deficit of about 15 million metric tons (Chart 14). The Current Path paints a picture of a growing gap between domestic food production and demand, a situation that will exacerbate Mozambique's agricultural trade deficit.   

Boosting agricultural productivity would not only raise the incomes of farm households, which account for a significant share of the country's population, but it would also lower food costs for the non-farm population and pave the way for agro-industry development. The GoM should enhance the efficiency of its agricultural support policies and programs to boost agricultural development, reduce poverty and ensure food security. Efforts should be made to address the high gender gap in agriculture. Women are disproportionately concentrated in subsistence agriculture in Mozambique, but they face more constraints than men in accessing essential productive resources and services, technology, market information and financing.

Chart 15 presents the import dependence in the Current Path and the Agriculture scenario, from 2020 to 2043.

Agriculture is the source of livelihood for millions of Mozambicans. Yet, according to the Current Path analysis, the sector faces several challenges that negatively impact productivity. Investing in agriculture can ensure food security, reduce resource conflicts, provide jobs, increase income and pave the way for economic diversification through agro-processing. Therefore, the interventions in this scenario constitute a coordinated push to unlock Mozambique’s agricultural potential. 

The interventions in the scenario reflect an aggressive yet reasonable improvement in agricultural productivity (average yields) as a result of adopting modern, climate-smart agricultural technologies, improved seedlings, and increased fertiliser and pesticide use. Likewise, irrigated land is increased to reduce the vulnerability of rainfed crops. The scenario also reduces post-harvest losses through improved storage facilities and enhanced market access (rural roads). Forest protection is also increased as a proxy for sustainable land practice. While the sector can benefit from increased export revenues, it should focus its attention first on establishing food security.

Under the Agriculture scenario, the average crop yield will be 6.5 tons per hectare by 2043, on par with the regional average. The country will produce about 10.2 million metric tons of additional food (crops) in 2043 compared to the Current Path. The agricultural crop import dependence will be about 22.1% of total crop demand compared to 36% in the Current Path in 2043.

Chart 16 depicts the progress through the educational system in the Current Path, for 2023 and 2043.

The Education scenario represents reasonable but ambitious improvements in intake, transition, and graduation rates from primary to tertiary levels and better quality of education at primary and secondary levels. It also models substantive progress towards gender parity at all levels, additional vocational training at the secondary school level, and increases in the share of science and engineering graduates.

Visit the theme on Education for our conceptualisation and details on the scenario structure and interventions.

Education is a critical driver of human development and economic productivity, and can be conceptualised as a pipeline through which learners progress. Children enter the system at the primary level and move through successive stages—lower-secondary, upper-secondary and, in some cases, tertiary education. Ideally, this process equips individuals with the skills needed to meet the country’s economic and labour market needs. Ensuring that a large proportion of learners successfully navigate key transition points, particularly the progression from primary to secondary education, is therefore essential for improving educational attainment and strengthening human capital development.

The educational system under Portuguese rule in Mozambique had a distinct dual structure. It aimed to provide basic skills to the majority of the African populace while offering liberal and technical education to the settler community and a small fraction of Africans. The vast majority of students, more than four-fifths, were limited to basic education within this colonial framework. Public education, supported by the state and the Roman Catholic Church, was predominant, although private options, primarily affiliated with religious institutions, also existed. Literacy in Portuguese, the primary language of instruction, was limited among the African population at the time of independence. 

The introduction of the National System of Education in the early 1980s aimed at enhancing literacy and technical skills across all age groups, catering to both part-time and full-time students. The nationalisation of private and religious educational institutions facilitated the restructuring and consolidation of the education system. Despite rapid expansion, the state struggled to meet the growing demand for education. Primary school enrolment surged from 643 000 in 1973 to approximately 1.5 million by 1979, but declined in the 1980s due to the destruction of schools by Renamo insurgents. The civil war destroyed critical infrastructure, including schools, and prevented meaningful education for the majority of the Mozambican older generation.

Only about 63.2% of the adult population was literate in 2024, which was about 21 percentage points below the average for Southern Africa, while only 47% of the adult population (15-24 years) completed primary school, and about 11.6% completed secondary education in 2024.

The education system in Mozambique is structured similarly to those of many countries in the region, comprising three main levels: primary, secondary and tertiary education. In 2018, the National Education System Law was revised, introducing a new sector structure and extending compulsory (and free) education from seven to nine years. As part of this reform, the duration of the education cycles was adjusted: primary education was reduced from seven to six years, while secondary education was expanded from five to six years. The law also formally recognised preschool as a sub-sector of education for the first time, although attendance is not required for entry into primary school. These reforms, together with increased government commitment and sustained investment in the sector, have contributed to notable progress. However, the system continues to face efficiency challenges, and a significant bottleneck between primary and lower-secondary education still limits overall educational attainment.

The GoM has made significant progress in expanding primary school enrolment, with the enrolment rate increasing by more than 80% between 1998 and 2024. As a result, Mozambique now records a higher primary school enrolment rate than many of its regional peers (Chart 20). This progress is largely due to primary education in Mozambique being free and compulsory. However, several barriers continue to limit students’ ability to access and remain in school, including the cost of school supplies, malnutrition during early childhood, gender norms and inadequate transport infrastructure. In 2024, Mozambique’s gross primary school enrolment rate stood at 123.1%. Gross enrolment rates above 100% typically indicate the presence of students who are outside the official age range for the level of education they are attending.

Despite high primary school enrolment rates, Mozambique’s human capital outcomes remain constrained by low completion rates. Only 36.5% of students enrolled in primary school reach the final grade of the primary cycle. As a result, although many Mozambican children enter primary education, only about half complete it, limiting the accumulation of foundational skills.

A significant bottleneck also exists in the transition from lower- to upper-secondary education. Only 27.7% of students who enter lower-secondary school complete it, and just 29% of those who do go on to enrol in upper-secondary education. As a result, the already small group of students who complete primary education becomes even smaller as they progress through the education pipeline. Consequently, only a limited number of students reach upper-secondary school. These weak outcomes at the lower-secondary level are a key factor behind low tertiary education attainment, ultimately constraining progress in reducing poverty and inequality.

Chart 17 presents the mean years of education in the Current Path and in the Education scenario, from 2020 to 2043, for the 15 to 24 age group.

The average years of education in the adult population aged 15 to 24 is a good first indicator of how the stock of knowledge in society is changing.

The average years of education among the adult population aged 15-24 years is a valuable indicator of how the stock of knowledge in society is changing. In Mozambique, the mean for this cohort is below the averages for its peers. In 2024, it was estimated at 8.7 years, slightly below the average of 8.7 years for Southern Africa.

According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), the low quality of Mozambique’s labour force remains a significant challenge. Employers often struggle to find adequately qualified workers, while the limited skills base also constrains the development of entrepreneurship. Due to low educational levels, some foreign companies operating in the country have resorted to importing labour. In response, the GoM recently increased the maximum quota for employing foreign workers as a share of the workforce—from 10% to 15% for companies with up to 10 employees, and from 8% to 10% for companies with 11–30 employees. The quotas remain unchanged at 8% for firms with 31–100 employees and 5% for those with more than 100 employees. At the same time, the government has expanded scholarship programs that enable Mozambican students to study abroad and acquire specialised skills, particularly in the extractives sector.

Skills mismatches are prevalent in Mozambique. In 2008, between 43% and 8% of the employed were underqualified for the positions they held, even as the labour market requires relatively low-skilled labour. The severe shortage of skilled labour is not only in managerial positions but also in skilled professionals such as engineers, technicians and accountants. Some companies often import skilled labour. The lack of sufficiently skilled labour is, therefore, a major challenge for moving the workforce from low-paying, low-productivity, informal and rural work to the more productive, formal sectors. 

The Current Path forecasts gradual improvements in education outcomes over time. By 2043, the mean education among the adult population aged 15-24 years will increase to 10.2 years. Under the Education scenario, the average educational attainment of adults aged 15-24 will increase to 10.8 years by 2043. The scenario will also improve primary school outcomes, with the completion rate rising to 63.5% by 2043, compared to 60.6% in the Current Path. In addition, the Education scenario will significantly expand secondary education participation and completion. By 2043, nearly 76% of age-appropriate students are projected to enrol in secondary school, compared to 55% in the Current Path. Lower-secondary completion will reach 50.1% (up from 41.4% in the Current Path), while upper-secondary completion rises to 37.4%, compared with 31.9% in the Current Path. As a result, the adult literacy rate will increase to 81.8%, about one percentage point higher than in the Current Path.

Since the benefits of education improvements take decades to materialise, expanding access and ensuring that more children progress from primary to secondary education now will be critical for improving long-term outcomes.

Chart 18 presents the value-add by sector as share of GDP in the Current Path, for 2023 and 2043.

In the Manufacturing scenario, reasonable but ambitious growth in manufacturing is envisaged through increased investment in the sector, research and development (R&D) and improved government regulation of businesses. 

Visit the theme on Manufacturing for our conceptualisation and details on the scenario structure and interventions.

The manufacturing sector in Mozambique is weak and unable to play a leading role in economic growth and development; it is limited to small-scale processing, and its contribution to GDP has declined since 2005. According to the 2022 Mozambican Manufacturing Firms survey, only 5% of firms export. The sector accounted for about 10% of GDP, on average, over the period 2000-2022, while agriculture, the extractive industry and services accounted for 24%, 18% and 45%, respectively. In 2023, manufacturing value added accounted for 7.3% of GDP, below the average of 9.2% for low-income countries in Africa. On the Current Path, manufacturing will account for 7.6% of Mozambique's GDP by 2043, below the projected average of 16.2% for low-income Africa.

In the interviews conducted during our fieldwork trip, many experts and economists indicated that the manufacturing sector in Mozambique has significant potential. Still, its performance has been hamstrung by several factors, such as weak transport infrastructure, which prevents the connection between farmers and manufacturing firms (downstream beneficiation), poor implementation of business regulation (officially one day is required to register a business but three months in practice),  the high cost of credit, technological delay and fierce competition from South African manufacturing firms.

Like in other African countries, many impoverished individuals in Mozambique find themselves entrenched in low-productivity sectors and informal service-based activities. Boosting the manufacturing sector will drive inclusive growth by facilitating the transition of low-income individuals from these sectors into higher-productivity areas. This structural shift not only boosts incomes but also fosters a positive cycle in which the growth of productive employment, capacities and earnings mutually reinforce one another, propelling economic expansion and poverty reduction. Expanding more dynamic sectors can further fuel this virtuous cycle, leading to sustained growth and increased prosperity. 

There is a need to enhance the manufacturing industry through strong backward and forward linkages with the agriculture, mining and service sectors to achieve sustained growth, reduce poverty and diversify sources of income and foreign exchange earnings. However, industrialisation or economic transformation is a long-term process. It requires constructive relationships between the state and the private sector that encourage and support it. Firms need a state that has strong capabilities in setting an overall economic vision and strategy, efficiently providing supportive infrastructure and services, maintaining a regulatory environment conducive to entrepreneurial activity and making it easier to acquire new technology and enter new economic activities and markets.

Chart 19 presents the contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP in the Current Path and in the Manufacturing scenario, from 2020 to 2043. The data is in US$ and % of GDP.

Without a robust manufacturing sector, sustained growth cannot be achieved, and sufficient jobs cannot be created to reduce poverty in the country. This scenario, therefore, models the impact of a concerted effort by the Mozambican authorities to unleash the potential of the non-extractive sector with a particular focus on manufacturing.

Under the Manufacturing scenario, the value added of the manufacturing sector will be US$826 million (equivalent to a percentage point of GDP) above the Current Path in 2043 (Chart 19).

Chart 20 depicts exports and imports as a percentage of GDP, from 2000 to 2043, in the Current Path.

The AfCFTA scenario represents the impact of fully implementing the African Continental Free Trade Agreement by 2034. The scenario increases exports in manufacturing, agriculture, services, ICT, materials and energy exports. It also includes improved multifactor productivity growth from trade and reduced tariffs for all sectors.

Visit the theme on AfCFTA for our conceptualisation and details on the scenario structure and interventions.

Mozambique’s economy is highly open to international trade, with total trade (exports plus imports) estimated at 96% of GDP in 2024, significantly higher than the averages for its peer groups—reflecting strong integration into global markets. However, the country’s trade structure remains narrow and commodity-dependent, with exports heavily concentrated in mineral fuels, particularly natural gas and coal. This concentration exposes the economy to external shocks, including fluctuations in global commodity prices and demand, as foreign-exchange earnings depend largely on the performance of the extractive sector.

At the same time, Mozambique relies substantially on imports of manufactured products and capital inputs, reflecting the limited diversification of its productive base and weak domestic industrial capacity. However, capital imports, such as machinery, industrial equipment and advanced technologies, are critical for supporting investment and production, particularly in capital-intensive sectors such as mining and energy. These imports enable the development and operation of large-scale extractive and infrastructure projects, which remain key drivers of export revenues, foreign-exchange inflows and government fiscal revenues.

At the regional level, Mozambique is a member of several regional integration frameworks, most notably the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Mozambique is also a member state of the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) Agreement, which seeks to integrate the markets of COMESA, the East African Community (EAC) and SADC into a single larger free trade area. However, Mozambique has not yet signed the agreement, which entered into force on 25 July 2024. Mozambique is also a state party to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), having ratified the agreement in July 2023. Participation in the AfCFTA is expected to expand market access across Africa, support export diversification and enhance the country’s resilience to external economic shocks, including fluctuations in global commodity prices and disruptions to international supply chains.

At the multilateral level, Mozambique is a member of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC), a platform for consultation and dialogue between China and African states, established in October 2000. In February 2018, Mozambique joined the European Union (EU)-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that was signed in June 2016 by Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa. The EU-SADC EPA entered into force provisionally in October 2016. Mozambique has remained eligible for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) since its inception. AGOA is still in force in 2026, but it has only been extended until December 2026, and its long-term future remains uncertain. AGOA provides preferential access to the United States (US) market, which would allow eligible countries to invest, upgrade and diversify their exports while producing opportunities for increased employment and value-capture of locally grown and produced goods. The country has not taken full advantage of the duty-free preference. In 2023, Mozambique’s exports to the US were just US$210 million.

Mozambique is a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), having joined the organisation in August 1995 following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. WTO membership integrates Mozambique into the rules-based multilateral trading system, supporting trade transparency, market access and dispute resolution while facilitating the country’s participation in global trade. 

Through these platforms, Mozambique participates in regional and global trade liberalisation initiatives aimed at facilitating trade, improving connectivity and promoting economic integration.  The GoM seeks to reform its trade regulations to improve its business climate and encourage exports. Customs duties remain high, and numerous non-tariff barriers persist in the country (such as slow customs clearance procedures).

On the Current Path, Mozambique's total trade will rise further to 133.5% of GDP by 2043, remaining well above the estimated averages of 73.7% and 68.3% for Africa’s low-income countries and the Southern Africa region, in the same year. This high trade-to-GDP ratio largely reflects the country’s strong integration into global commodity markets and the significant role of large-scale extractive industries, particularly natural gas, in driving export growth.

Mozambique's trade has suffered due to the economic slowdown from the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, which has driven up fuel and basic food prices. In 2024, Mozambique's exports accounted for 42.7% of its GDP, underscoring its firm reliance on external trade. The country’s export composition is highly concentrated in homogeneous goods (aluminium, coal, natural gas and other extractive resources), which account for the majority of the country’s export earnings. 

Mozambique's export basket concentration can be assessed by examining the combined share of its top five export products. A higher combined share indicates a more concentrated export profile, whereas a lower share signals a more diversified export base. In 2024, Mozambique’s top five exports together represented 69.8% of total earnings—petroleum gas (23.8%), briquettes and similar manufactured solid fuels (21.6%), raw aluminium (13.3%), titanium ore (6.8%) and electricity (4.4%). The primary destinations for Mozambique’s exports were India, China, Singapore, South Africa and South Korea. 

In the Current Path, Mozambique’s exports will rise to 53.3% of GDP by 2043, largely driven by expected export gains from new natural gas production. This level would exceed the National Development Plan target of 42.5% by 2043, highlighting the significant role that the gas sector is expected to play in expanding the country’s export base.

Mozambique’s imports accounted for 72.8% of GDP in 2024. The top five imported products were refined petroleum (15%), chromium ore (12.1%), ferroalloys (7.1%), iron ore (4.1%) and rice (3%)–together representing 41.3% of total imports (Chart 40). These imports mostly originated from South Africa, China, India, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.

Looking to the future, Mozambique’s import values as a share of GDP are projected to decline to 78.6% by 2043. However, this would remain about 39.6 percentage points above the GoM’s target of reducing imports to 39% of GDP. Over the same period, the trade deficit is expected to narrow modestly, declining from 27.2% of GDP in 2024 to 23.6% by 2043. This would still fall far short of the GoM’s target of reducing the trade deficit to 1.2% of GDP by 2043.

Chart 21 presents the trade balance in the Current Path and in the AfCFTA scenario, from 2020 to 2043 as a percentage of GDP.

The implementation of the National Export Strategy, which aims to move Mozambique’s economy up the value chain, could alter this outlook by promoting greater diversification and higher-value exports. In addition, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) presents an important opportunity to improve Mozambique’s trade balance through expanded regional trade.

However, Mozambique has not yet submitted its tariff offer or its commitments in the five priority services sectors (financial, tourism, business, communication and transport) under the AfCFTA framework. To fully benefit from the agreement, the country will need to identify and support sectors where it has a comparative advantage and develop a clear business strategy to integrate into regional value chains. Without such a strategic approach, trade liberalisation could risk undermining domestic industries rather than strengthening them.

Under the AfCFTA scenario, Mozambique’s trade deficit is projected to widen slightly to about 25.6% of GDP by 2043, roughly 2 percentage points higher than in the Current Path (Chart 21). At the same time, total trade (exports plus imports) will decline marginally to around 132.2% of GDP. Economically, this outcome reflects the asymmetric structure of Mozambique’s trade. Trade liberalisation under the AfCFTA will eliminate tariffs and lower import costs, thereby stimulating demand for manufactured goods and intermediate inputs from more industrialised African economies. 

Because Mozambique’s export base remains narrow and concentrated in a few capital-intensive commodities, its ability to rapidly expand exports to regional markets may be limited in the short to medium term. As a result, imports may grow faster than exports, widening the trade deficit even as regional trade barriers fall. Over time, however, if Mozambique successfully diversifies production and integrates into regional value chains, the AfCFTA could help strengthen export capacity and gradually improve the trade balance.

Chart 22 presents the Current Path of access to electricity for urban, rural and the total population from 2000 to 2043.

The Large Infrastructure and Leapfrogging scenario involves ambitious investments in road and renewable energy infrastructure, improved electricity access and accelerated broadband connectivity. It emphasises adopting modern technologies to enhance government efficiency and incorporates significant investments in major infrastructure projects like rail, ports and airports (other infra) while highlighting the positive impacts of renewables and ICT.

Visit the themes on Large Infrastructure and Leapfrogging for our conceptualisation and details on the scenario structure and interventions.

Infrastructure in Mozambique is generally poor, constraining the growth and diversification of the economy. Infrastructure development has widespread benefits to productivity and human well-being and has many direct linkages to poverty and inequality reduction.  

The fact that most Mozambicans reside in rural areas complicates infrastructure provision, as it is usually much more cost-effective and easier to provide infrastructure to urban residents than in remote rural settings. In 2025, Mozambique ranked 46th out of 54 African countries and lowest in the Southern Africa region (Chart 26) on the African Infrastructure Development Index (AIDI), with an index of 54.8 out of 100. The AIDI is developed by the African Development Bank, and comprises four composite indexes for electricity, transport, ITC, water and sanitation. 

Electricity access is critical for socio-economic development, poverty reduction and human well-being. It provides multiple social and economic benefits, from improved industrial capacity, business development opportunities, telecommunications, healthcare and education that directly improve employment. Mozambique has one of the largest electricity generation potentials in Southern Africa and among the highest on the continent, with the potential to become a regional hub, providing opportunities for investment and rapid socio-economic development.  It is rich in renewable (hydro, solar, geothermal and tidal) and non-renewable (gas and coal) energy resources, with an estimated potential to generate 187 gigawatts of electricity from coal, hydro, gas and wind, with natural gas expected to provide 44% of total grid electricity. 

Mozambique generates most of its electricity from hydropower, notably the Cahora Bassa Dam on the Zambezi River, which accounts for more than 80% of national production. However, a substantial share of this electricity is exported to South Africa. Despite having sufficient generation potential to meet domestic demand, access to electricity remains low due to the limited reach and underdevelopment of the national grid. In 2024, the GoM announced that it would end half a century of hydropower supply from Cahora Bassa to South Africa, with the current contract set to expire on 31 December 2030.

Mozambique is a net exporter of electricity to neighbouring countries, including Eswatini, Lesotho, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with South Africa as the largest importer. However, the country’s domestic utilisation of its energy resources remains limited and unevenly distributed. As a result, reliable and sustainable energy access, particularly in rural areas, remains relatively low compared to neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. At the same time, urban areas continue to face challenges related to poor service quality and reliability.

In 2023, only 36% of Mozambique’s total population had access to electricity, significantly lower than in South Africa (87.7%), Zambia (51.1%) and Zimbabwe (62%), and below the 40% average for low-income African countries. In the same year, Mozambique ranked 45th out of 54 African countries in terms of domestic electricity access.

Only 8.9% of the rural population had access to electricity in 2023, compared to South Africa (94), Zambia (17.6%) and Zimbabwe (33.7%), and to an average of 23.6% for its peers.  Although Mozambique’s grid has grown, it is not dense enough to supply electricity in many rural communities, where over 60% of the population lives. The main challenge is therefore to expand the network—a task that, given the long distances and the distribution of the population over 800 000 square kilometres, will require massive investments.

The GoM has attempted to rectify this urban-rural disparity by passing new legislation in 2021 to improve the regulation of off-grid energy solutions. The new regulations seek to make private investment easier and more attractive and circumvent the high tariffs currently in place.  Even though a tax exemption on certain solar equipment was announced in 2022, its non-implementation means that high import tariffs and VAT on solar home systems continue to hinder off-grid solutions. Other challenges include ageing and underdeveloped transmission infrastructure, consumer growth and the bureaucracy involved in developing new power projects.  Electricity transmission losses account for more than 15% of production. As in many African countries, the cost of electricity service provision and its relationship to public expenditure and revenue-raising remain key development concerns for Mozambique.

Mozambique is financially constrained from developing new electricity infrastructure and relies mostly on donor funds and FDI. Excessive financial risks (including rent-seeking, weak institutional capacity and governance failures) associated with developing electricity infrastructure make investment unattractive to private-sector actors, further inhibiting the supply of affordable and reliable electricity. To promote private investment, the GoM launched the Renewable Energy Auctions Programme in 2020, funded by the EU. The program aims to make the tender process more transparent and improve competitiveness. The first Independent Power Producer was approved in 2022, with Total Eren aiming to provide 40 MW of solar power by 2024. The Auctions Programme aims to facilitate the construction of two additional solar projects with a combined capacity of 80 MW.

Batteries remained the main source of power (38.9%), especially in rural areas (56.6%), followed by firewood (12.7%). The use of biomass and firewood poses health risks, degrades the environment through deforestation and soil erosion, and perpetuates gender inequality, as women are mainly responsible for gathering these fuel sources.

Chart 23 presents the number of people using cookstoves in the Current Path and in the Large Infrastructure and Leapfrogging scenario, from 2020 to 2043.

Limited access to electricity in Mozambique, particularly in rural areas, means that most households still rely on traditional, polluting and inefficient fuels for cooking. An estimated 93% of the population relies on solid biomass for cooking, and in urban areas such as Maputo, 85% of households use charcoal. Moreover, cooking with biomass stoves poses serious health risks, especially for women and children, due to prolonged exposure to indoor air pollution, which can lead to respiratory illnesses. At the same time, reliance on biomass fuels contributes to deforestation, forest degradation and significant carbon emissions, further intensifying climate change.

If the Large Infrastructure and Leapfrogging scenario is effectively implemented, the share of households using traditional cookstoves could decline from about 90% in 2023 to roughly 67.2% by 2043, a 16.2 percentage-point decline from the Current Path for the same year (Chart 23). At the same time, the proportion of households using modern cookstoves will rise from 5.2% in 2023 to 46.3% by 2043, compared with 29.3% under the Current Path.

These projections suggest that expanding access to electricity and off-grid renewable energy solutions, particularly in rural areas, could significantly accelerate the transition away from traditional cooking methods. Such a shift would reduce pressure on forests, lower carbon emissions, and improve household energy efficiency.

Chart 24 presents the percentage of the population and number of people with access to mobile and fixed broadband in the Current Path and in the Large Infrastructure and Leapfrogging scenario, from 2020 to 2043. The user can toggle between mobile and fixed broadband.

Mozambique faces significant challenges in realising the full potential of the ICT sector to support economic development and achieve ICT-related SDG targets. The high cost of digital devices and low literacy rates remain major barriers to connectivity. At the same time, large rural–urban disparities in access persist, compounded by limited electricity and financial services in rural areas. The sector is further constrained by a notable gender gap in internet use and mobile phone ownership, driven largely by educational and income inequalities between men and women. The GoM aims to close the gap by establishing digital villages, an infrastructure scheme that will improve connectivity and ICT access in rural communities. The emergence of mines and energy projects will drive ICT infrastructure investments in rural areas of Mozambique.

Although Mozambique's digital infrastructure is still far from reaching universal access, it has undergone rapid evolution. In 2024, an estimated 18.8% of the population had internet access. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic led companies and users to move to online platforms and remain sustainable by establishing remote work systems.

A comparison of internet access and mobile phone subscriptions in Mozambique with the averages of its peer countries shows that connectivity levels remain relatively low. In 2024, mobile phone subscriptions were estimated at 28.6 per 100 people, well below the averages of 40.6 for low-income African countries and 75.1 for Southern Africa. Under the Current Path, mobile phone subscriptions in Mozambique will increase significantly, reaching 106 per 100 people by 2043. In the Large and Leapfrogging scenario, mobile broadband subscriptions will rise to 108 by 2043.

Fixed broadband access will remain particularly limited. Fixed broadband provides faster, more secure internet connections and is essential for developing high-value-added services in the digital economy. However, broadband penetration in Mozambique is strikingly low, with only 1.6 subscriptions per 100 people in 2023. On the Current Path, this figure will rise to 19.2 subscriptions per 100 people by 2043. In the Large and Leapfrogging scenario, fixed broadband will increase by 14 subscriptions per 100 people compared to the Current Path, reaching 33.2 subscriptions per 100 people.

Chart 25 presents the trends in FDI, aid and remittances in the Current Path and in the Financial Flows scenario as a percentage of GDP, from 1990 to 2043.

The Financial Flows scenario represents a reasonable but ambitious increase in inward flows of worker remittances, aid to poor countries and an increase in the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) and additional portfolio investment inflows. We reduce outward financial flows to emulate a reduction in illicit financial outflows.

Visit the theme on Financial Flows for our conceptualisation and details on the scenario structure and interventions.

Mozambique is a significant recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) in Africa. For two decades after the civil war, Mozambique emerged as a favoured recipient of donors' support, receiving 10 to 15% of total FDI inflows into sub-Saharan Africa.  Much of this FDI has financed large projects in the extractive industry with limited connection with the broader domestic economy.

Mozambique has benefited significantly from extensive development cooperation and ODA, notably from key contributors such as the US. Based on findings from a Congressional Research Service Report, Mozambique received an average annual aid of US$452 million from the US government between 2016 and 2018 aimed at supporting primary healthcare services, acquiring essential medical infrastructure and facilitating the training of healthcare professionals. The report further highlighted that international aid to Mozambique, spanning from 2008 to 2017, averaged US$1.96 billion annually, positioning Mozambique as the 15th-highest recipient of global aid from the international community.

These substantial FDIs and ODA inflows facilitated Mozambique’s sustained, rapid post-civil war economic growth and political stability. In reaction to the 2016 clandestine loan, estimated at US$2 billion, donors that provided budget support including the IMF, united in cutting off financial aid to the government and demanded independent inquiries into the debts. Concessional lending from international financial institutions became limited, with ODA falling from 17.5 to 12.4% of GDP between 2013 and 2018. FDI dried up as international investors lost confidence. With almost half of the yearly national budget derived from donor funds, a suspension of aid impacted the country’s economic stability significantly. The Metical (domestic currency) depreciated drastically, inflation surged to 17.4% by the end of 2016 and fiscal space narrowed markedly.  Mozambique’s external public and publicly guaranteed debt ballooned from 61% of GDP in 2016 to 104% in 2018 and the country inevitably defaulted on its debt in 2016. As a result, credit rating agencies downgraded the sovereign to selective or restricted default and the World Bank and the IMF re-classified Mozambique’s external debt to ‘in distress’. 

In 2024, foreign aid inflows to Mozambique were estimated at 15.8% of GDP, marking a substantial decline from the average of around 40% of GDP recorded in the early 1990s. This reflects the country’s gradual transition from high dependence on donor financing toward greater reliance on domestic resources and private capital flows. Under the Current Path, aid inflows are projected to decline further to about 12.4% of GDP by 2043. Over the same period, FDI inflows will increase slightly, rising from 15.7% of GDP in 2024 to about 16.1% by 2043, largely driven by continued investment in large-scale extractive and energy projects, particularly in the natural gas sector.

Remittances play an important role in mitigating poverty in Mozambique, particularly for households that depend on income sent by migrant workers, many of whom are employed in South Africa. These transfers provide a crucial source of financial support for families, helping to cover basic needs such as food, education and healthcare.

Between 2005 and 2023, Mozambique received an average of about US$146 million in remittances annually, with flows rising from a low of US$45.8 million in 2005 to a peak of US$434.6 million in 2018. In 2024, remittance inflows were estimated at US$215.8 million, equivalent to about 1.2% of GDP.

Beyond their contribution to poverty reduction and human development, remittances are generally more stable than other external financial flows, such as FDI, which tend to fluctuate with global economic conditions. As a result, remittances can serve as a reliable source of foreign exchange, helping support the country’s balance of payments. Strengthening policies that reduce the cost and improve the speed and accessibility of remittance transfers could therefore help increase inflows and enhance their developmental impact.

Like many other African countries, Mozambique experiences illicit financial flows (IFF). It is estimated that between 2005 and 2014, 10% of total government revenue left the country illicitly. This is a deeply worrying reality given that there is a proven link  between the extent of natural resources a country has and the magnitude of IFF. Given how weak governance controls in Mozambique are, research illustrates that an enabling environment is created for IFF to flourish in the country.

Chart 26 presents government revenue in the Current Path and in the Financial Flows scenario, from 2020 to 2043. The data is in US$ 2017 and % of GDP. 

Wagner's law, or the law of increasing state activity, states that public expenditure increases as national income rises. In the Financial Flows scenario, it is reasonable to expect that government revenues will increase as a percentage of GDP compared to the Current Path.

In the Financial Flows scenario, which assumes improvements in revenue administration, higher aid absorption, tapping diaspora remittances and curbing IFFs and corruption, foreign aid inflow could recover modestly, reaching 14.4% of GDP by 2043, a 1.6 percentage point above the Current Path projection. 

This scenario aligns with SDG 17, which emphasises strengthening global partnerships and improving the sustainability of development financing. By attracting greater private investment, it would help Mozambique reduce its reliance on humanitarian and concessional aid while increasing development-oriented financing. Under this scenario, FDI inflows will rise to 22.3% of GDP by 2043, which is 5.8 percentage points higher than the Current Path forecast.

Government revenue will increase across the forecast horizon to reach US$18.6 billion in 2043, US$2.5 billion larger than the Current Path in the same year (Chart 26).

Several pathways might explain the positive association between capital inflows and government revenue. The first is direct because the GOM relies heavily on donors for its budget. More aid means more revenue for the GoM to provide public services. Another is indirect: higher inflows are associated with higher tax revenue because foreign direct investors tend to have good tax compliance habits or are subject to natural resource taxes. Higher inflows are also associated with higher economic growth and, therefore, higher government revenues.

Chart 27 presents the Current Path of government effectiveness comparing the country to the average for the African income group, from 2002 to 2043.

The World Bank’s index on government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.

Good governance is key to economic progress. Greater security and stability at the national level create an enabling environment for domestic and foreign investment. It creates conditions for governments to pursue effective, sustainable development strategies. Good governance and security cut across all sectors; they create incentives and confidence for investment and innovation. Good governance is crucial for the efficient use of public funds for development and improving the well-being of the population.

Mozambique has a long history of military and political instability. In recent years, the country has faced armed conflict and insurgency, particularly in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, where militant Islamist groups have been active. Despite these challenges, Mozambique has consistently held multiparty presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections since the end of the civil war in 1992. 

The October 2024 elections were held in a highly polarised political environment. They were followed by disputes over the credibility of the results and allegations of electoral irregularities, which further heightened political tensions. These developments reflect longer-standing challenges in the country’s democratic process. Tensions remain between its three main political groups: the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo), the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), and the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM). The quality of the elections has deteriorated over the years. 

Discussions with experts during our field trip highlighted that the quality of democracy in the country has been deteriorating along with the decline in the rule of law in recent years. The political environment is highly polarised; institutions are weak and instrumentalised by political parties, while decentralisation, which was supposed to improve public service delivery rather, serves to accommodate political interests.

Poor governance remains at the root of many citizens' frustrations and grievances across various groups in the country; civil service capacity is low, and perceptions of financial corruption by Mozambique’s political elite are high, as evidenced by the 2016 clandestine loan. Despite strong economic growth, many Mozambicans feel left behind in the country’s development, and the growing discontent within the young population is a concern for the country’s long-term democratic stability. According to the 2023 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) report, overall governance in Mozambique has deteriorated over the last decade. The country ranked 28th of 54 African countries on the Index, with a score of 49 out of 100, lower than the regional average for Southern Africa (54.6). A score of 100 represents the successful delivery of political, social and economic public goods and services that citizens expect from their government, and for which the state is responsible. According to the report, security and the rule of law have significantly deteriorated since 2018.

Corruption indicators have been progressively deteriorating in Mozambique. During our interview with the civil society in Maputo, one participant indicated that corruption is ’the single biggest obstacle to the country’s future.’ According to the 2025 global Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency International, Mozambique, with a score of 21 out of 100, ranks 161st out of 180 countries surveyed, down from 25 in 2023. Lower scores indicate higher perceived corruption, while 100 reflects a very clean public sector.

High levels of corruption in Mozambique continue to undermine government effectiveness and weaken the state’s capacity to deliver public services. This challenge is closely linked to a patronage-based political culture where political support is often exchanged for benefits and public goods, and weak institutions are among the underlying factors in the persistence of corruption and the gradual deterioration of governance in Mozambique. 

In the IFs model, the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness Index is scaled from 0 to 5, with higher values indicating stronger performance. In 2024, Mozambique recorded a score of approximately 1.76 out of 5, ranking 27th out of 55 African countries on government effectiveness.

Chart 28 presents the security, capacity and inclusion index for the Current Path versus the Governance scenario, for 2023 and 2043.

This scenario assumes better governance: stability, capacity and inclusion. It measures a state’s progress using the average of these three indices. To this end, it includes an index (0 to 1) for each dimension, with higher scores indicating improved outcomes. participation rates, particularly among females where appropriate.

Note that the scenario includes increased welfare transfers to unskilled workers, which are paid for by taxes on skilled workers. Note: the two should roughly balance one another in US$ terms. In the context of high poverty levels and inequality, social transfers have proven the most effective short/medium-term measures of alleviating both.

Visit the theme on Governance for a full conceptualisation and details on the scenario structure and interventions.

An increasing body of literature shows that weak governance and corruption severely hamper economic performance and development. Good governance will therefore be crucial for achieving the objectives of the National Development Strategy (2023-2043). In the National Development Strategy, the operationalisation of the governance pillar will focus on transparency, democratic participation, efficiency in public administration, modernisation, responsibility and the fight against corruption, creating an environment conducive to investment and sustainable development.

On the Current Path, governance indicators in Mozambique will improve slightly by 2043 relative to their 2023 levels, but they will remain below the Southern Africa regional average.

In IFs, governance can be analysed along three dimensions–security, capacity and inclusion–reflecting the traditional sequencing of the state formation process. The score for each dimension ranges from zero (bad) to one (excellent). The security dimension measures the probability of intra-state conflict and the general level of risk. The second dimension, capacity, is related to government revenue, corruption, regulatory quality, economic freedom and government effectiveness. The third dimension, inclusiveness, measures the level of democracy and gender empowerment.

Mozambique performs poorly in capacity relative to other dimensions of governance. This reflects weak government revenue mobilisation and government effectiveness, high levels of corruption and poor regulatory quality. On the Current Path, Mozambique will make gradual progress across all three dimensions of governance (security, capacity and inclusion). As a result, the country’s score on the composite governance index, calculated as the simple average of these three dimensions, will be about 15% higher in 2043 than its level in 2024.

Achieving sustainable stability and security in Mozambique, while strengthening governance and democracy, will likely require sustained efforts to address underlying socio-economic grievances, promote greater inclusivity and strengthen state institutions.

Under the Governance scenario, Mozambique’s score on the composite governance index will increase by about 29% between 2026 and 2043, compared with an improvement of 13% on the Current Path over the same period. By 2043, the country’s overall governance score will reach 0.65, compared with 0.58 on the Current Path.