Mali

This page provides an overview of the key characteristics of Mali along its likely (or Current Path) development trajectory. The Current Path forecast from the International Futures forecasting (IFs) platform is a dynamic scenario that imitates the continuation of current policies and environmental conditions. The Current Path is therefore in congruence with historical patterns and produces a series of dynamic forecasts endogenised in relationships across crucial global systems. We use 2019 as a standard reference year and the forecasts generally extend to 2043 to coincide with the end of the third ten-year implementation plan of the African Union’s Agenda 2063 long-term development vision.

The desert nation of Mali is characterised by its Sahelian climate and membership of the G5 Sahel. The G5 is the group of five Sahelian countries that came together to create the G5 Sahel Joint Force in February 2014, with its secretariat in Nouakchott, Mauritania. The Convention on the Establishment of the G5, adopted by the heads of state of the five countries on 19 December 2014, set out the main objectives of the G5 Sahel: 1) to guarantee conditions for development and security, 2) to offer a strategic framework for interventions to improve people’s living conditions, 3) to align development with security, supported by democracy, and 4) to promote inclusive and sustainable regional development.[1European Council on Foreign Relations, G5 Sahel – Mapping African regional cooperation]

Mali is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), founded in 1975 by the Treaty of Lagos, which Mauritania left in 2000 (though it continues to maintain an observer status), and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, or UEMOA in French). Mali, along with the other four members of the G5 Sahel, is a member of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which has had extremely limited activity following the turmoil in Libya, where its secretariat is based.

The Sahel region has historically been highly porous. Ancient trans-Saharan trade routes facilitated cross border trade and a transhumance lifestyle for hundreds of years, predating the French colonial period.

This way of life is now under dire threat. Climate change is having a devastating impact on the G5 Sahel countries. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) notes that the Sahel has ‘experienced the most substantial and sustained decline in rainfall recorded anywhere in the world within the period of instrumental measurements during the 1980s.2Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Working Group II: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability’ Environmental degradation and violent conflict have displaced millions of people and will continue to worsen the environmental crisis in the area.3OCHA, Lake Chad Basin: Crisis overview, 26 July 2017.Furthermore, these five countries are projected to experience some of the most severe climate change impacts globally as early as 2030. These impacts range from increasingly variable rainfall, rising temperatures and more frequent droughts to prolonged heat waves.4Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN), The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report: What’s in it for Africa?, 2014, 14

Moreover, successive decades of poor governance and neglect across the Sahel have provided a fertile breeding ground for radicalisation and violent resistance against central governments generally seen as indifferent, corrupt, oppressive and exploitative.

Mali’s population of approximately 19.6 million people in 2019 is among the youngest in the world. An estimated 9.2 million Malians were children (under the age of 15) in 2019, comprising nearly half of the country’s total population. And although Mali’s population structure has changed little over the last three decades (in 1990, of Mali’s population of 8.4 million, 3.9 million were children), the total population has soared. On the Current Path, this trend will continue: Mali’s population is projected to reach approximately 38 million people by 2043 — nearly double today’s estimate.

Mali is a predominantly rural country, with 57% of the population living in rural areas in 2019. Low-income Africa is however more rural than Mali: in 2019, seven out of ten people across low-income Africa lived in rural areas. Neighbouring Niger, in fact, is among the most rural countries in the world; over 83% of Niger’s population lived in rural areas in 2019.

By 2007, most of the global population lived in cities, marking a critical transition in human geography. On the Current Path, Mali will reach this point in 2030, and Africa around eight years later. Low-income Africa, meanwhile, is projected to remain predominantly rural beyond the forecast horizon.

The government of Mali needs to implement a more robust and decentralised model of urban governance to ensure that urbanisation serves as an enabler for the roll out of services and for improvements in the well-being of large sections of the population.

Spanning 1.24 million km2, Mali is the eighth largest country in Africa, comparable to the sizes of Angola (1.25 million km2) and South Africa (1.22 million km2). With a population size resembling that of Burkina Faso (20.3 million people) and Malawi (18.6 million people), which have far smaller land areas, Mali is sparsely populated.

The large majority of Malians live in the southern half of the country, which comprises only 34% of Mali’s total land area. This southern half is more suitable for agriculture thanks to the Niger River and is home to nearly all of Mali’s sizeable cities, of which the capital city Bamako is the largest. Conversely, the north of the country has faced continuous depopulation fuelled by desertification, instability and the attraction of urban life in the south.

In 2019, Mali had an estimated GDP of US$20 billion, which is comparable to neighbouring Burkina Faso (US$24 billion), Zimbabwe (US$19.4 billion) and Botswana (US$23 billion). On the Current Path, the Malian economy will grow to US$33.1 billion by 2030 and to US$73.6 billion by 2043. The increasingly steep slope of this forecast reflects Mali’s rapid population growth rate which has characterised, and will continue to characterise, its demographic landscape.

Although many of the charts in the sectoral scenarios also include GDP per capita, this overview is an essential point of departure for interpreting the general economic outlook of Mali.

In 2019, average incomes in Mali were estimated to be US$2 284 — slightly higher than the low-income African average of US$1 660 but significantly behind lower middle-income Africa, where the average person earns an income of US$6 989.

Since 1990, Mali’s GDP per capita has grown by just roughly 40%. Over the past decade, GDP per capita has grown by 12% (from US$2 001 in 2009). On the Current Path, the average Malian will be earning US$2 638 by 2030, marking a roughly 13% increase over 2019. By 2043, average incomes are projected to reach US$3 834 in Mali. By that year, the average GDP per capita in low-income Africa is projected to catch up with Mali.

In 2019, one-third of the Sahelian nation’s GDP was generated by the informal sector, and according to the International Labour Organization, more than seven out of ten economically active Malians work in the informal sector.5International Labour Organization (ILO), Mali On the Current Path, the informal economy’s share of Mali’s economy will remain mostly unchanged throughout the forecast horizon.

Such a large informal sector is fairly average for low-income Africa, and the economies of Mali’s neighbours Burkina Faso, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania and Guinea also are characterised by significant informal activities. Generally, large informal economies often fill gaps left by governments; in Angola, for example, large and complex informal businesses organise and implement the distribution of clean water, as the Angolan government has performed poorly in delivering basic services to the large and rapidly growing population. Moreover, large informal economies generally constrain the development of their formal counterpart, which provides job security and employment benefits and contributes to government revenues through taxation.

However, data and projections on informal sectors are notoriously difficult to obtain and calculate accurately, and thus must be considered within the context of qualitative and culturally sensitive research.

The IFs platform uses data from the Global Trade and Analysis Project (GTAP) to classify economic activity into six sectors: agriculture, energy, materials (including mining), manufactures, services and information and communication technologies (ICT). Most other sources use a threefold distinction between only agriculture, industry and services with the result that data may differ.

Examining the contributions of key sectors of an economy is a helpful exercise in understanding its structure and how it may evolve in the future. In 2019, the service sector added the most value to Mali’s economy (42.6%, or US$8.5 billion), followed by the agriculture sector (32.3%, or US$6.4 billion), the manufacturing sector (17.6%, or US$3.5 billion), the ICT sector (4.2%, or US$0.8 billion), the energy sector (2.1%, US$0.8 billion), and, lastly, the materials sector (1.3%, or US$0.3 billion). Many low-income African countries share this economic structure.

On the Current Path, the value added of the agriculture and energy sectors will decrease in the coming decades to 12.4% and 0.9% in 2043, respectively. The share of all other sectors, meanwhile, will increase, particularly manufacturing, which is projected to comprise nearly one-third of Mali’s economy by 2043. The value added of all sectors, however, will increase in absolute terms.

The data on agricultural production and demand in the IFs forecasting platform initialises from data provided on food balances by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). IFs contains data on numerous types of agriculture but aggregates its forecast into crops, meat and fish, presented in million metric tons. Chart 9 shows agricultural production and demand as a total of all three categories.

Producing nearly 17 million tons of crops in 2019, Mali is the leader in crop production in the G5 Sahel — the group of five countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) located in Africa’s Sahel region. The primary subsistence crops produced here include cowpea, millet and sorghum, while cotton and groundnuts are the most popular cash crops.

On the Current Path, crop production in Mali, and across the Sahel, will improve only slightly, reaching 20.3 million tons in 2030 and 24.7 million crops in 2043. Meanwhile, Mali and its neighbours will continue to rely on food imports to meet domestic agricultural demand. Food demand in Mali reached 18.2 million tons in 2019 and will increase dramatically on the Current Path to 25.9 million tons by 2030 and to 37.2 million tons by 2043, driven by rapid population growth. By that year, production is projected to reach only 24.7 million tons.

Faced by the increasingly severe impacts of climate change, instability, and poor governance, battling food insecurity will be among Mali’s most challenging and complex tasks in the coming decades and beyond.

There are numerous methodologies for and approaches to defining poverty. We measure income poverty and use GDP per capita as a proxy. In 2015, the World Bank adopted the measure of US$1.90 per person per day (in 2011 international prices), also used to measure progress towards the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1 of eradicating extreme poverty. To account for extreme poverty in richer countries occurring at slightly higher levels of income than in poor countries, the World Bank introduced three additional poverty lines in 2017:

• US$3.20 for lower middle-income countries
• US$5.50 for upper middle-income countries
• US$22.70 for high-income countries.

Extreme poverty counts among Mali’s most urgent issues. In 2019, Mali’s poverty was estimated 45%, which translates to 8.5 million Malians living under the extreme poverty rate of US$1.90 per day. While the 2019 poverty rate estimate marks an improvement since 2015, when it was estimated at 48.5%, poverty levels in Mali are just barely below the average for low-income Africa (47.8%) and actually higher than those of the other members of the G5 Sahel with the exception of Niger, whose poverty rate mirrors that of Mali. In both Chad and Burkina Faso, around 37% of the population lives in extreme poverty; in Mauritania, it is only 11.4%.

On the Current Path, Mali’s extreme poverty rate will decline in the long term, but only slightly. However, owing to Mali’s extremely rapid population growth, the number of Malians living in poverty is projected to continue growing until 2040, at which point 12.43 million people in Mali are projected to be living under the extreme poverty line.

The IFs platform forecasts six types of energy, namely oil, gas, coal, hydro, nuclear and other renewables. To allow comparisons between different types of energy, the data is converted into billion barrels of oil equivalent (BBOE). The energy contained in a barrel of oil is approximately 5.8 million British thermal units (MBTUs) or 1 700 kilowatt-hours (kWh) of energy.

Despite significant opportunities for solar and wind power, the large majority of the approximately the 16 million BBOE Mali produced in 2019 were derived from gas — roughly 80% (13 million BBOE), to be exact. Fortunately, hydroelectricity is responsible for the next largest share of Mali’s energy production and generated 2 million BBOE (or 12% of Mali’s energy production) in 2019. Other renewable sources, such as wind power, comprised 1 million BBOE, or 6%.

On the Current Path, hydroelectric and other renewable energy generated in Mali will grow in both absolute and relative terms, reflecting a number of dynamics. First, as a finite resource, Mali’s reserves of fossil fuels are limited. Second, Mali is pursuing further developing its hydroelectric and other renewable energy infrastructure. For example, the African Development Bank is currently working with Mali on the Mini Hydropower Plants and Related Distribution Networks Development Project, which the Bank executed in January 2018 and is expected to be completed by the end of 2022.6African Development Bank Group, Mali – Mini Hydropower Plants and Related Distribution Networks Development Project (PDM-HYDRO)

Carbon is released in many ways, but the three most important contributors to greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide (CO2), carbon monoxide (CO) and methane (CH4). Since each has a different molecular weight, IFs uses carbon. Many other sites and calculations use CO2 equivalent.

Generating 1.02 million tons of carbon in 2019, Mali’s contribution to global greenhouse gas emission — and even African greenhouse gas emissions — is miniscule, largely owing to the fact that its level of development and manufacturing sectors are not sophisticated enough to be carbon intensive. In 2019, total emissions from the entire continent of Africa reached 422 million tons of carbon, thanks in large part to South Africa, which emitted a disproportionately large amount of 132.1 million tons. The rest of the world, meanwhile, emitted 9.26 billion tons that year, with highly industrialised nations like the United States and China to blame.

On the Current Path, Mali’s emissions will increase by nearly 800% over the forecast horizon to 8 million tons in 2043. But even if Mali were to emit that amount today, the nation would still only be responsible for 6% of South Africa’s 2019 emissions. Nonetheless, it is important that Mali continues to aggressively pursue renewable energy options and transition away from fossil fuels towards clean energy can produce numerous local health and agricultural benefits, such as cleaner air.

The Stability scenario represents reasonable but ambitious reductions in risk of regime instability and lower levels of internal conflict. Stability is generally a prerequisite for other aspects of development and this would encourage inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and improve business confidence. Better governance through the accountability that follows substantive democracy is modelled separately.

The intervention is explained here in the thematic part of the website.

Across the Sahel, violent extremism and insecurity hamper efforts to improve security and living conditions. For example, organised crime is contributing to the erosion of traditional hierarchies in the north, where businesses and other elites are increasingly implicated as colluding with corrupt security services to share profits with politicians in the south.7B Zogg, Organized crime: Fueling corruption and Mali’s desert war, IPI Global Observatory, 27 February 2018 In fact, the concept of ‘ungoverned’ or ‘alternatively governed’ spaces8See AK Clunan and HA Trinkunas (eds), Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2010. in northern Mali and elsewhere pervades security discussions about stability, as does the evident collapse of formal state structures in parts of the Sahel region. However, it is important to recognise that large parts of Mali, particularly in the north, have never been formally governed.

Chart 13 shows the governance security index for Mali in the Current Path forecast and in the Stability scenario. This index captures the probability of internal war and vulnerability to conflict. Mali outperforms the average for low-income Africa on this index, scoring 1.93 in 2019 compared to the average low-income African score of 1.37. Nonetheless, Mali and low-income Africa’s scores remain among the poorest globally. On the Current Path, Mali’s score will reach 1.78 by 2030 and 2.09 by 2043, suggesting modest but not insignificant improvements in the nation’s susceptibility to internal war and conflict. In the Stability scenario, however, Mali is projected to achieve a score of 2 by 2035 and 2.22 by 2043, evidencing the improved stability and reduced internal conflict levels modelled in the Stability scenario.

Additionally, violent extremism remains a critical threat in the region. The government of Mali, along with the other governments of the G5 Sahel, needs to promote, deepen and enforce policies of good governance and humanitarian principles to combat this growing phenomenon.

In 2019, measured using GDP per capita, the average Malian earned approximately US$2 284. In the Current Path forecast, average income is forecast to reach US$3 834 by 2043. Meanwhile, average income in low-income Africa — currently lagging behind Mali — is projected to increase more rapidly and nearly converge with Mali by 2043 on the Current Path.

The ambitious but achievable improvements modelled in the Stability scenario result in only modest average income growth in the long term compared to the Current Path forecast. Average income in Mali is forecast to reach US$4 092 by 2043 in the Stability scenario, which is US$258 greater than the Current Path forecast for that year, reflecting the modest yet positive effect of greater stability.

In 2019, Mali’s poverty was estimated at 45%, which translates to 8.5 million Malians living under the extreme poverty rate of US$1.90 per day. On the Current Path, Mali’s extreme poverty rate will decline in the long term, but only slightly, and the number of Malians living in extreme poverty will increase until at least 2040.

The Stability scenario offers a slightly more optimistic future, one in which extreme poverty remains pervasive but is reduced earlier and more dramatically than on the Current Path. In the Stability scenario, the poverty rate falls to approximately 28% by 2043, and the absolute number of people living in poverty peaks at 11.4 million people in the late 2030s. By 2043, 1.37 million fewer people in Mali would be living below the poverty line in the Stability scenario than on the Current Path.

As a complex and extremely challenging issue, poverty alleviation will require concerted efforts from the whole of Mali’s government, the private sector and international actors.

This section presents the impact of a Demographic scenario that aims to hasten and increase the demographic dividend through reasonable but ambitious reductions in the communicable-disease burden for children under five, the maternal mortality ratio and increased access to modern contraception.

The intervention is explained here in the thematic part of the website.

Demographers typically differentiate between a first, second and even a third demographic dividend. We focus here on the contribution of the size of the labour force (between 15 and 64 years of age) relative to dependants (children and the elderly) as part of the first dividend. A window of opportunity opens when the ratio of the working-age population to dependants is equal to or surpasses 1.7.

However, a favourable age structure does not automatically generate economic growth. People must also have access to clean water and sanitation facilities, sufficient food and quality education and jobs.

Mali and its fellow G5 Sahel members count among the youngest and most rapidly growing nations in the world. In economic terms, this poses a great challenge. In 2019, the ratio of working-age Malians to dependants was 1.02 to 1. In other words, for every person of working age, there is another person either too young or too old to work. By 2030, this ratio will have shifted slightly to 12 workers to every 10 dependants, which is still far below the economically ideal ratio of 17 workers to every 10 dependants.

The Demographic scenario slightly improves this outlook: by 2043, there will be approximately 15 workers to every 10 dependants in this scenario, whereas on the Current Path, there will be 14 workers to every 10 dependants. Calculating the economic benefits of this difference in Mali’s demographic structure is difficult. However, it is clear that the health (and healthcare access) improvements modelled in the Demographic scenario are insufficient to speed up Mali’s progress towards the ratio of 17 workers to every 10 dependants even over the next two decades.

The infant mortality rate is the number of infant deaths per 1 000 live births and is an important marker of the overall quality of the health system in a country.

In 2019, Mali’s infant mortality rate was estimated to be 57 deaths per 1 000 live births — higher than the low-income African average of 48.5 and the second highest in the G5 Sahel, behind Chad (74.3 deaths per 1 000 live births). These are extremely high infant mortality rates that reveal the severe lack of basic services and infrastructure, such as clean water, sanitation and basic healthcare, in Mali and across its African income peers. For perspective, high-income Africa’s average infant mortality rate was estimated at 9.8 deaths per 1 000 live births in 2019.

The Current Path offers a fairly optimistic future of infant mortality rates in Mali: by 2030, it is projected to fall to 34 deaths per 1 000 live births; by 2043, 18 deaths. Current Path forecasts for other Sahelian nations and low-income Africa are less optimistic, with more gradual declines expected in the coming decades. Mali’s expected improvements in its infant mortality rate may reflect the fact that it is beginning from an incredibly high level.

In the Demographic scenario, Mali’s infant mortality rate falls more steeply to 29 deaths by 2030 and to 14 deaths by 2043. In this scenario, Mali’s infant mortality rate would dip below that of low-income Africa by the mid-2020s instead of the early 2030s.

Average incomes, measured by GDP per capita, in Mali grow only slightly more rapidly in the Demographic scenario. By 2043, GDP per capita reaches US$3 926 in the Demographic scenario — only US$92 greater than the Current Path forecast for that year. Unfortunately, this forecast signifies that the achievable but aggressive improvements in Mali’s communicable-disease burden for children under five, the maternal mortality ratio and access to contraception are not enough to meaningfully affect Malians’ livelihoods.

Extreme poverty is one of Mali’s most challenging issues. In 2019, Mali’s poverty of 45% translated to 8.5 million Malians living below the extreme poverty rate of US$1.90 per day. And because of Mali’s extremely rapid population growth, the number of Malians living in poverty will continue to grow on the Current Path until 2040, when 12.43 million people in Mali are projected to be extremely poor.

The improved infant and maternal health outcomes modelled in the Demographic scenario only slightly impact this forecast. In the Demographic scenario, one million fewer Malians will be living in extreme poverty in 2043 than on the Current Path. While this marks an improvement — an 8.3% improvement in 2043, to be exact — it is underwhelming. This forecast shows that more than targeted demographic interventions are necessary to significantly reduce poverty in Mali.

This section presents reasonable but ambitious improvements in the Health/WaSH scenario, which include reductions in the mortality rate associated with both communicable diseases (e.g. AIDS, diarrhoea, malaria and respiratory infections) and non-communicable diseases (NCDs) (e.g. diabetes), as well as improvements in access to safe water and better sanitation. The acronym WaSH stands for water, sanitation and hygiene.

The intervention is explained here in the thematic part of the website.

The average Malian lives to approximately 65 years of age. This life expectancy is on par with low-income Africa (64 years of age) and just below lower middle-income Africa (68 years of age). On the Current Path, Mali’s average life expectancy will grow to 70 years of age by 2030 and 74 years of age by 2043.

The Health/WaSH scenario modestly improves this forecast. In this scenario, Mali’s average life expectancy would reach 71 by 2030 — one year longer than the Current Path forecast for the year. Water and sanitation infrastructure and lower disease burdens are essential to long and healthy lives but alone are insufficient to lengthen life expectancies in the face of political volatility, dismal economic performance and internal conflict.

The Health/WaSH scenario will reduce the infant mortality rate in Mali to 16.5 deaths per 1 000 lives births in 2043 from 57.3 deaths in 2019, representing more than a 250% increase over the 24-year period. Compared to low-income countries in Africa, Mali’s infant mortality rate was higher in 2019 and will only get better in the Health/WaSH scenario by 2043. By 2043, the Health/WaSH scenario will improve infant mortality rate by 10% compared to the Current Path forecast by that time.

The Agriculture scenario represents reasonable but ambitious increases in yields per hectare (reflecting better management and seed and fertiliser technology), increased land under irrigation and reduced loss and waste. Where appropriate, it includes an increase in calorie consumption, reflecting the prioritisation of food self-sufficiency above food exports as a desirable policy objective.

The intervention is explained here in the thematic part of the website.

The data on yield per hectare (in metric tons) is for crops but does not distinguish between different categories of crops.

Improving agricultural productivity in Mali and across the Sahel is a gargantuan task. A temperature increase of 2°C over pre-industrial levels — a virtual certainty in the region — could reduce millet and sorghum yields (two of the most important crops for local food security) by up to 25% by 2080. On the Current Path, Mali’s yields will virtually stagnate at the 2019 estimate of 2.4 tons per hectare, reaching 3.2 tons per hectare by 2043. This forecast does not present a hopeful future for crop production in Mali. For comparative purposes, across Northern Africa, average yields reached around 6.5 tons per hectare in 2019; in Egypt, 29.2 tons per hectare.

The Agriculture scenario offers a slightly more food secure future for Mali in which yields nearly double by 2043, reaching 4.5 tons per hectare. In this scenario, Mali’s yields catch up with those of South Africa, which were double those of Mali in 2019. However, given Mali’s rapid population growth and quickly growing food demand as shown in Chart 9 and the devastating effects of climate change, the country will most likely depend on food imports to feed its people for the foreseeable future.

In 2019, Mali depended on food imports to meet approximately 8% of domestic food demand, which is average for low-income Africa. On the Current Path, the effects of climate change on key staple crops such as sorghum and millet and extremely rapid population growth will deepen Mali’s dependence on imports to feed the population. By the early 2030s, Mali is projected to depend on food imports to feed one-quarter of domestic demand; by 2043, it will need to import 30% of its domestic food demand. This story will likely play out across the Sahel and many other regions in Africa.

However, the aggressive but achievable agricultural interventions modelled in the Agriculture scenario succeed in actually reducing Mali’s import dependence to 11% of domestic demand by 2030 and preventing significant increases out to 2043. Improving efficiency in the agricultural sector, as it is vital in reducing poverty in the region, will require an integrated approach that boosts capacity, efficiency and resilience.

On the Current Path, average incomes in Mali will improve steadily from the 2019 estimate of US$2 284 to US$3 834 by 2043. In the Agriculture scenario, which, among other effects, dramatically reduces the country’s dependence on food imports to meet its domestic food demand, average income is set to reach US$4 217 by 2043, marking an increase of US$383 over the Current Path forecast for that year. This indicates a substantial improvement and demonstrates the powerful effect of heightened agricultural productivity on the Sahelian nation.

In Mali, an estimated 45% of the population, equating to 8.75 million Malians, lived under the extreme poverty line of US$1.90 per day in 2019. On the Current Path, the share of the population living in extreme poverty will decrease over the forecast horizon, but the number of impoverished people will increase owing to rapid population growth to over 12 million by 2043.

The Agriculture scenario dramatically reduces poverty in Mali compared to the Current Path. By 2043, the poverty rate falls to 22.4%, or 8.49 million people, which is approximately 3.5 million people fewer than the Current Path forecast for that year. Agriculture is central to Malian livelihoods, and the improvements to the sector modelled in this scenario help to prevent the number of impoverished Malians from increasing in the coming decades.

The Education scenario represents reasonable but ambitious improved intake, transition and graduation rates from primary to tertiary levels and better quality of education. It also models substantive progress towards gender parity at all levels, additional vocational training at secondary school level and increases in the share of science and engineering graduates.

The intervention is explained here in the thematic part of the website.

Across the G5 Sahel, education levels are extremely low. With the average adult having received three years of education in 2019, Mali has among the lowest educational attainment levels globally. In the G5 Sahel, only Niger has a lower level of educational attainment, with the average adult having received 2.7 years of education in 2019. Mali lags behind its income peers in this measure. In 2019, the average individual in low-income Africa had 4.4 years of education. There is also a large gender gap in education in Mali, even within the context of a region with very low levels of overall educational attainment.

On the Current Path, the average Malian in 2043 will have 5.2 years of education — a very concerning forecast. In the Education scenario, this figure increases only slightly to 5.7 years of education by 2043. The improved educational attainment modelled in the Education scenario alone is not enough to address the deeper structural issues faced by the education system, which include internal conflict, political instability and inadequate or absent basic infrastructure.

In 2019, average test scores in Mali were estimated at 31.2, above the low-income African average of 27.7. On the Current Path, this measure of education quality improves only barely, reaching 33.4 by 2043, suggesting that significant developments in education quality in Mali will not be achieved without targeted intervention.

The Education scenario represents such a targeted intervention. In this scenario, average test scores reach 38.7 by 2043, which is higher than the lower middle-income African forecast for that year of 35.3 and even the upper middle-income African forecast of 37.5.

In 2019, the average Malian earned approximately US$2 284, measured using GDP per capita. On the Current Path, average incomes reach US$3 834 by 2043. Meanwhile, average incomes in low-income Africa — currently lagging behind Mali — are projected to increase more rapidly and nearly converge with Mali by 2043 on the Current Path.

The improved education outcomes modelled in the Education scenario have an underwhelming impact on incomes in Mali. In 2043, in the Education scenario, the average Malian will earn US$3 981 — only US$147, or 3.8%, greater than the Current Path forecast for that year. Education plays a critical role in building and sustaining a prosperous society but must be accompanied by water and sanitation infrastructure and stable governance, among other things, to meaningfully impact livelihoods.

An estimated 45% of the Malian population, equating to 8.75 million people, lived below the extreme poverty line of US$1.90 per day in 2019. On the Current Path, the share of the population living in extreme poverty will decrease over the forecast horizon, but the number of impoverished people will increase owing to rapid population growth to over 12 million by 2043.

Interventions in education alone are not enough to meaningfully reduce poverty in Mali. In the Education scenario, the poverty rate falls to 29.2% by 2043 — only 2.6 percentage points lower than the Current Path forecast for that year. In the Education scenario, 1.02 million fewer people will be living under the poverty line in 2043 than on the Current Path. While not insignificant, the effect of the Education scenario on poverty is modest, reflecting the multiple drivers of poverty in Mali, which include but are not limited to low educational attainment.

The Manufacturing/Transfers scenario represents reasonable but ambitious manufacturing growth through greater investment in the economy, investments in research and development, and promotion of the export of manufactured goods. It is accompanied by an increase in welfare transfers (social grants) to moderate the initial increases in inequality that are typically associated with a manufacturing transition. To this end, the scenario improves tax administration and increases government revenues.

The intervention is explained here in the thematic part of the website.

Chart 30 should be read with Chart 8 that presents a stacked area graph on the contribution to GDP and size, in billion US$, of the Current Path economy for each of the sectors.

The Manufacturing/Transfers scenario changes the contributions of various sectors of Mali’s economy to GDP, and affects most dramatically the contributions of the manufacturing and service sectors. More specifically, in the Manufacturing/Transfers scenario, the manufacturing sector’s value added to GDP increases by nearly one percentage point by 2034 before tapering back down to converge with the Current Path forecast by 2040. The service sector’s value added, meanwhile, increases in the long term to 1.6 percentage points over the Current Path forecast by 2043. Conversely, the agricultural sector’s value added falls by 1.2 percentage points below the Current Path forecast by 2043 as the manufacturing and service sectors begin to play more important roles in the economy.

However, the absolute contributions of all sectors increases over the forecast horizon, with the service sector taking the lead. In the Manufacturing/Transfers scenario, the service sector contributes US$5.5 billion more to GDP in 2043 than it does on the Current Path, while the manufacturing sector contributes US$2.4 billion more. The increases in the contributions of each of the other sectors relative to the Current Path do not exceed US$5 million.

Government welfare transfers, which are essentially social grants to vulnerable populations aimed at improving livelihoods, were estimated at only 0.1% of Mali’s GDP in 2019. On the Current Path, this figure will not exceed 1% over the forecast horizon.

The Manufacturing/Transfers scenario offers a slightly different future in which the government of Mali transfers 1.5% of GDP by 2043 — 0.7 percentage points higher than the Current Path forecast for that year. Even a relatively minor increase in transfers can help to reduce poverty.

The Manufacturing/Transfers scenario presents a dramatically different future for Mali than the Current Path. GDP per capita, or average incomes, is forecasted to only reach US$2 638 by 2030 and US$3 834 by 2043 on the Current Path. The interventions modelled in the Manufacturing/Transfers scenario, which accelerate the growth of the manufacturing sector, improve investment in research and development, and increase social grants, have a profound impact on livelihoods in Mali.

By 2043, the average Malian will earn US$6 876 in 2043 in the Manufacturing/Transfers scenario, serving as proof of the transformative power of economic restructuring focused on manufactures and of government welfare transfers.

The impact of the Manufacturing/Transfers scenario on poverty in Mali is complex. Over the short and medium term, Mali’s poverty rate increases, which often occurs when countries transition their economies away from agriculture and services and towards manufacturing. However, the positive effects of this scenario on poverty begin to take place in the late 2030s, and in 2043, 11.29 million Malians are projected to be living in poverty in the Manufacturing/Transfers scenario. On the Current Path, 12.08 million people will be impoverished in 2043.

To mitigate the negative effects of the economic transition to manufacturing, more substantial social grants are necessary.

The Leapfrogging scenario represents a reasonable but ambitious adoption of and investment in renewable energy technologies, resulting in better access to electricity in urban and rural areas. The scenario includes accelerated access to mobile and fixed broadband and the adoption of modern technology that improves government efficiency and allows for the more rapid formalisation of the informal sector.

The intervention is explained here in the thematic part of the website.

Fixed broadband includes cable modem Internet connections, DSL Internet connections of at least 256 KB/s, fibre and other fixed broadband technology connections (such as satellite broadband Internet, ethernet local area networks, fixed-wireless access, wireless local area networks, WiMAX, etc.).

Broadband subscriptions are critical for economic growth, regional integration and human development more broadly. In Mali, they are quite limited, with approximately 2.5 fixed broadband subscriptions per every 100 people in 2019 — comparable to the average for low-income Africa (2.3 subscriptions for every 100 people). Subscriptions in Mali increase only modestly on the Current Path, reaching 31.5 subscriptions for every 100 people by 2043. The Leapfrogging scenario features a much more rapid uptake of this technology, with 18.8 subscriptions for every 100 people in 2030 and 50 subscriptions by 2043.

Mobile broadband refers to wireless Internet access delivered through cellular towers to computers and other digital devices.

With an estimated 33 mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 people in 2019, Mali outperformed the average for low-income countries in Africa, which reached only 23 mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 people in 2019. Mobile broadband subscriptions have the potential to improve the quality of life of vulnerable or marginalised populations who have little access to health, educational and economic resources.

On the Current Path, mobile broadband subscriptions increase fairly rapidly in Mali — a reflection of the generally rapid uptake of technology in many developing countries. In the Leapfrogging scenario, mobile broadband subscriptions increase dramatically in the short term before reaching saturation levels as rates reach 140 subscriptions per 100 people.

Economic growth in all the G5 Sahel countries is constrained by poor infrastructure, including inadequate roads, limited access to improved water, sanitation and hygiene (WaSH) facilities, low rates of electrification and a lack of basic information and communications technology. In 2019, two out of every five Malians (or 8 million people) had access to electricity. In the G5 Sahel, only Mauritania, with its access rate of 43% in 2019, has a better electricity access rate than Mali.

On the Current Path, two out of every three people in Mali will have access to electricity in 2043. This rate improves more dramatically in the Leapfrogging scenario, in which Mali’s electricity access rate increases dramatically to 80% — or four out of every five people — by 2043. Such a substantial increase in electricity access rates in Mali would have the potential to significantly improve livelihoods across the country.

GDP per capita, or average incomes, is forecasted to only reach US$2 638 by 2030 and US$3 834 by 2043 on the Current Path. The interventions modelled in the Leapfrogging scenario, which include greater investment in renewable energy technology, accelerate growth in average incomes in Mali. By 2043, the average person in Mali will earn US$4 317 in the Leapfrogging scenario — a nearly 13% increase over the Current Path forecast for that year and significantly above the projected average for low-income Africa.

The poverty rate in Mali, estimated at 45% in 2019, decreases more rapidly in the Leapfrogging scenario than on the Current Path. By 2043, 26% of Mali’s population will be living in poverty in the Leapfrogging scenario, compared to 32% on the Current Path. In other words, 2 million fewer people will be living below the poverty line by that year in the Leapfrogging scenario. While the Leapfrogging scenario offers a more optimistic future for Mali, it falls short of substantially resolving the desert nation’s complex poverty challenges.

The Free Trade scenario represents the impact of the full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) by 2034 through increases in exports, improved productivity and increased trade and economic freedom.

The intervention is explained here in the thematic part of the website.

The trade balance is the difference between the value of a country's exports and its imports. A country that imports more goods and services than it exports in terms of value has a trade deficit, while a country that exports more goods and services than it imports has a trade surplus.

The large majority of Mali’s exports earnings come from gold, and to a lesser extent from oil, iron, fertilisers and cotton. The weak economic structures and widespread insecurity and internal conflict across the G5 Sahel, however, severely impair Mali’s ability to help grow and stabilise its economy. In 2019, Mali’s trade balance was estimated at −17% of GDP.

Although this trade deficit is projected to improve on both the Current Path, and in the Free Trade scenario, Mali’s deep dependence on imported food and other basic goods will hinder its ability to reduce its trade deficit beyond 7% of GDP through the forecast horizon.

Mali’s GDP per capita, or average incomes, is forecasted to only reach US$2 638 by 2030 and US$3 834 by 2043 on the Current Path. The interventions in the Free Trade scenario, which represent the impact of the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) by 2043, help to accelerate income growth. By 2043, the average person in Mali will be earning US$4 265, compared to US$3 834 on the Current Path. This forecast illustrates that substantially improving livelihoods for most Malians will require more than enhanced trade.

Trade openness will reduce poverty in the long term after initially increasing it due to the redistributive effects of trade. Most African countries export primary commodities and low-tech manufacturing products, and therefore a continental free trade agreement (AfCFTA) that reduces tariffs and non-tariff barriers across Africa will increase competition among countries in primary commodities and low-tech manufacturing exports. Countries with inefficient, high-cost manufacturing sectors might be displaced as the AfCFTA is implemented, thereby pushing up poverty rates. In the long term, as the economy adjusts and produces and exports its comparatively advantaged (lower relative cost) goods and services, poverty rates will decline.

The severity of poverty in Mali is reflected in its estimated rate of 45% in 2019. In the Free Trade scenario, the share of Mali’s population that is living in poverty falls rapidly to 25%, or one in four people, by 2043. On the Current Path, the poverty rate also decreases, but to only 32% by 2043 — in other words, nearly one in three Malians.

In absolute terms, the effect of the Free Trade scenario on poverty is substantial. In 2043, 9.4 million people will be living in poverty in the Free Trade scenario compared to 12.1 million people in the Current Path forecast.

However, it is important to note that the projected poverty rates in the Free Trade scenario, while marking an improvement over the Current Path, remain high and would necessitate urgent intervention to improve access to basic goods and services and to increase average incomes.

The Financial Flows scenario represents a reasonable but ambitious increase in worker remittances and aid flows to poor countries, and an increase in the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) and additional portfolio investment inflows to middle-income countries. We also reduced outward financial flows to emulate a reduction in illicit financial outflows.

The intervention is explained here in the thematic part of the website.

With foreign aid comprising approximately 8.3% of the economy in 2019, Mali receives more foreign aid as a share of GDP than the average of its African income peers at 6.8%. In fact, Niger is the only country in the G5 Sahel that receives more foreign as a share of GDP than Mali. On the Current Path, foreign aid to Mali will fall slightly to 5.9% by 2043. In the Financial Flows scenario, foreign aid decreases more slowly to 6.6% of GDP in 2043.

By providing more aid to low-income and conflict-affected nations like Mali, the international community might be able to increase government capacity, but the provision of external support should complement national efforts at revenue collection and the effective provision of services. However, since aid tends to amplify the nature of the regime (i.e. it makes authoritarian governments more authoritarian and vice versa), donors must also be cautious. Aid partners also risk being associated with the counter-insurgency actions of national governments, which may prove counterproductive to building partnerships with local actors.

In 2019, inflows of FDI comprised roughly 3.3% of Mali’s GDP — similar to Chad (2.6%) and Burkina Faso (2%). On the Current Path, inflows of FDI as a share of GDP will stagnate at just over 3% by the mid-2030s, reflecting the deleterious effects of the harsh economic, climatic and security conditions on Mali’s business environment. The Financial Flows scenario offers a slightly more optimistic future, in which FDI inflows stabilise at 4% of GDP by the mid-2030s. Neighbouring Mauritania, meanwhile, will on the Current Path receive FDI inflows equivalent to over 10% of GDP by 2030.

Mali is one of the largest remittance recipients in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2019, Mali received US$800 million in remittances, equal to 4.2% of GDP. With inward remittances of 0.7% of GDP in 2019, Burkina Faso is the second largest recipient of remittances (measured as a percentage of GDP) within the G5 Sahel.

However, sub-Saharan Africa has the highest average remittance transfer costs of any world region, making it increasingly difficult for people to send money across borders. In the last quarter of 2019, average remittance transfer costs in sub-Saharan Africa were estimated at 8.9% while the global average was 6.8%. Both rates far exceed the Sustainable Development Goals target for remittance transfer fees of 3%.9C Heitzig, Figure of the week: Remittance flows to sub-Saharan Africa expected to slow after years of growth, The Brookings Institution, 25 June 2020 Generally, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries are often larger than aid and more stable than private capital inflows. After declining for two consecutive years, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries have in recent years resumed their upwards trajectory.

In the Financial Flows scenario, remittance as a percentage of GDP is set to decline to 3.6% by 2043, 1.4 percentage points higher than the Current Path forecast by the same time. In absolute terms, the difference between the Current Path forecast and Financial Flows scenario is significant. In the Financial Flows scenario, remittances reach US$2.7 billion by 2043 — US$400 million greater than the Current Path forecast for that year.

In 2019, average incomes in Mali were US$2 284 — slightly higher than the low-income African average of US$1 660 but behind lower middle-income Africa, where the average person earns an income of US$6 989.

In the Financial Flows scenario, average incomes in Mali over the next two decades are more or less equivalent to the Current Path. By 2043, the average Malian would be earning only 2% (US$74) more in the Financial Flows scenario than on the Current Path. Clearly, the economic changes modelled in the Financial Flows scenario, which generally represent reduced illicit financial outflows and increased aid, foreign direct investment and remittances alone, are modest in improving livelihoods in Mali.

In 2019, Mali’s poverty was estimated at 45%, or 8.5 million Malians living below the extreme poverty rate of US$1.90 per day. On the Current Path, Mali’s extreme poverty rate will decline slightly in the long term, but the number of extremely poor people will grow until 2043 owing to rapid population growth.

In the Financial Flows scenario, poverty rates in Mali remain essentially unchanged from the Current Path forecast. By 2043, the extreme poverty rate is only 1.7 percentage points lower in the Financial Flows scenario than on the Current Path (30.1% and 31.8%, respectively). A more comprehensive approach to addressing the complex problem of extreme poverty is necessary.

The Infrastructure scenario represents a reasonable but ambitious increase in infrastructure spending across Africa, focusing on basic infrastructure (roads, water, sanitation, electricity access and ICT) in low-income countries and increasing emphasis on advanced infrastructure (such as ports, airports, railway and electricity generation) in higher-income countries.

Note that health and sanitation infrastructure is included as part of the Health/WaSH scenario and that ICT infrastructure and more rapid uptake of renewables are part of the Leapfrogging scenario. The interventions there push directly on outcomes, whereas those modelled in this scenario increase infrastructure spending, indirectly boosting other forms of infrastructure, including that supporting health, sanitation and ICT.

The intervention is explained here in the thematic part of the website.

In 2019, 40.5% of Malians had access to electricity, compared to 32.2% of an average low-income African country. In the Current Path forecast, access to electricity is forecast to increase to 66.2% by 2043, still higher than the average for income peers in Africa of 60.

In the Infrastructure scenario, far more people in Mali gain access to electricity — which is essential for improving livelihoods in developing nations — far more quickly than on the Current Path. By 2043, 78.1% of the population of Mali has access to electricity in 2043 — 12 percentage points higher than the Current Path forecast for that year.

Indicator 9.1.1 in the Sustainable Development Goals refers to the proportion of the rural population who live within 2 km of an all-season road and is captured in the Rural Access Index.

In 2019, only 18% of Mali’s population had access to an all-weather road — a type of transportation infrastructure essential to the provision of basic services and access to health services and economic opportunities. In this area, Mali is lagging behind its African income peers, which had an average access rate of 43% in 2019.

On the Current Path, this rate will increase to just under 30% by 2043. In the Infrastructure scenario, Mali’s all-weather road access rate improves more rapidly to 33% in 2043 — or three out of every ten people. Indeed, this is an insufficient improvement to dramatically impact livelihoods in Mali. Additionally, even in the Infrastructure scenario, Mali lags behind the Current Path forecast for low-income Africa.

In the Infrastructure scenario, average incomes in Mali are only slightly improved compared to the Current Path forecast. By 2043, the average person in Mali will be earning US$3 987 in the Infrastructure scenario compared to the Current Path forecast of US$3 834 by that year.

In other words, the improved water, sanitation, electricity and ICT infrastructure modelled in the Infrastructure scenario only effect a 2% improvement in average incomes over the Current Path forecast by the end of our forecast horizon. While critical to development and improving livelihoods, basic infrastructure must be accompanied by improved governance and stability to meaningfully raise average incomes in developing nations facing complex climate threats like Mali.

As one of Mali’s most complex and urgent challenges, the economic, social, health and environmental factors underlying extreme poverty require targeted whole-of-government interventions. While indispensable to improving health and economic outcomes, effective governance and political stability, among other factors, must accompany improved basic infrastructure to substantially reduce poverty.

The modest effect of the Infrastructure scenario on poverty evidences this point. By 2043, the extreme poverty rate falls to 29.8% — only two percentage points below the Current Path forecast for that year. The effect of this improvement on the absolute number of people living in poverty is nontrivial. In the Infrastructure scenario, 750 000 fewer Malians will be extremely poor by 2043 than on the Current Path, meaning more can be done by the government of Mali to meaningfully reduce poverty in the coming decades.

The Governance scenario represents a reasonable but ambitious improvement in accountability and reduces corruption, and hence improves the quality of service delivery by government.

The intervention is explained here in the thematic part of the website.

As defined by the World Bank, government effectiveness ‘captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies’.

Chart 51 presents the impact of the interventions in the Governance scenario on government effectiveness.

In 2019, Mali received a low government effectiveness score of 1.63 from the World Bank government effectiveness index. Mali’s African income peers received an average score of 1.37, suggesting that Mali’s government slightly outperforms those of low-income Africa in this area.

On the Current Path, Mali’s score will improve to 2.09 by the end of the forecast horizon, reflecting IFs’ generally optimistic expectations that with a general trend of improving economic performance and development outcomes in the coming decades, the effectiveness of Mali’s governance will improve. In the Governance scenario, Mali’s score increases more rapidly to 2.22 by 2043.

On the Current Path, average incomes in Mali will reach US$3 834 by 2043. In the Governance scenario, the improved accountability and reduced corruption have an underwhelming impact on livelihoods in the desert nation. By 2043, average incomes reach U$3 999 in the Governance scenario, marking an improvement of only 4% over the Current Path forecast for that year. Governmental interventions must be accompanied by economic and social interventions to substantially impact incomes in Mali.

The Governance scenario has a modest effect on poverty, reducing Mali’s poverty rate by 2.3 percentage points compared to the Current Path forecast by 2043, the end of the second ten-year implementation of the Agenda 2063. In absolute terms, this means 11.2 million people — 1.6 million fewer people than on the Current Path — would be living in extreme poverty that year.

While accountable governance and effective service delivery are critical to improving livelihoods, economic growth is necessary to raise average incomes and in turn reduce poverty.

This section presents projections for carbon emissions in the Current Path for Mali and the 11 scenarios. Note that IFs uses carbon equivalents rather than CO2 equivalents.

When weighing the effects of the scenarios on development, considering the impact on carbon emissions is crucial. Indeed, Malians are extremely vulnerable to the effects of climate change, particularly on agriculture, the backbone of the economy.

That said, as is explored in Chart 12, Mali’s 2019 carbon emissions of 1.02 million tons are relatively extremely low. Even the Current Path forecast of 800 million tons in 2043 is equivalent to only 6% of South Africa’s emissions in 2019.

As would be expected, the Demographic scenario is the only scenario in which Mali’s forecasted carbon emissions fall below the Current Path forecast. All of the other scenarios — the Free Trade and Agriculture scenarios, particularly — increase Mali’s carbon emissions, but only slightly. In the Free Trade scenario, Mali emits 8.79 million tons of carbon in 2043, which is approximately 10% greater than the Current Path forecast of 8 million tons for that year.

Nonetheless, pursuing renewable energy and minimising reliance on carbon-intensive energy sources is a wise strategy for both the short and the long term. With its huge renewable energy potential, Mali could protect itself from the volatility of the global oil market, and reduce the harmful localised effects of oil and gas activities on air quality and sensitive ecologies, in turn improving health and the ability of Mali’s fragile environment to provide protection, food and water.