South Sudan

Chart 1 is a political map of South Sudan.

South Sudan, officially the Republic of South Sudan, is the 18th-largest country in Africa, and the 42nd-largest in the world, with a surface area of about 644 329 km². It is one of the sixteen landlocked countries in Africa, situated in the eastern region of the continent. South Sudan shares borders with Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the east, Kenya to the southeast, Uganda to the south, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the southwest and the Central African Republic to the west. 

South Sudan gained independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011. This independence followed Africa’s longest civil war (1983-2005), which killed and displaced millions of people. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement not only ended that war but also established autonomy and a pathway to secession.

South Sudan’s independence followed an overwhelming 98.8% of voters supporting secession in the January 2011 referendum, making South Sudan the world’s newest nation and Africa’s 54th country. However, since its independence, South Sudan has struggled to establish a stable system of governance and has faced persistent challenges, including widespread corruption, political infighting and communal violence. The country ranked 180 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index, underlining the governance crisis that development efforts must confront.

In 2013, a civil war broke out between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and those supporting his then-Vice President, Riek Machar. What began as a political power struggle quickly escalated into an ethnic conflict, causing immense suffering, widespread violence and mass displacement. Several peace agreements, most notably the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), signed in 2018, and the formation of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) in 2020, have sought to restore stability and establish a power-sharing government. The transitional period was extended (from February 2025 to February 2027) to give more time for the government to implement provisions in the R-ARCSS and prepare the country for elections. Despite positive steps, the peace process faces challenges, such as the unification of armed forces and the delayed drafting of a permanent constitution.

Despite multiple peace deals, implementation lags, and unification of forces continues, constitutional reforms remain incomplete. Communal clashes and insecurity persist, and the Fragile States Index has consistently ranked South Sudan among the most fragile states (3rd in 2024). Furthermore, the country is in a severe humanitarian crisis. In 2025-2026, roughly 7.5 to 7.7 million South Sudanese face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+), with some areas experiencing catastrophic conditions. Driven by chronic conflict, climate disasters like floods, and economic crises, this situation leaves millions reliant on dwindling humanitarian aid.

Beyond conflict, South Sudan’s physical environment also profoundly shapes its development prospects. South Sudan is a land of incredible diversity, combining within its boundaries much of the physical, social and economic variation seen throughout Africa as a whole. Its terrain is remarkably diverse, encompassing vast plains, swamps and tropical forests. The country experiences a tropical climate, with hot conditions year-round. The dry season from December to February brings intense heat and minimal rainfall, followed by a rainy season from June to September, which is cooler and more humid.

Climate variability, severe droughts and floods already cripple agriculture and infrastructure, a trend likely to worsen with ongoing climate change. Building climate resilience (as emphasised in Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goal 13) is thus a key development priority. The central and northern regions are dominated by the sudd, one of the world’s most extensive wetlands. Yet, water management is a critical concern, given the country’s heavy dependence on the Nile River. Despite these environmental constraints, South Sudan possesses rich natural resources, including oil and fertile land that supports agriculture and livestock.

South Sudan is one of the world’s most oil-dependent economies. Oil has provided about 90% of government revenue and nearly all export earnings. This reliance makes the country extremely vulnerable to shocks. In 2024, for example, conflict in Sudan shut a pipeline carrying approximately 70% of South Sudan’s oil exports, causing a fiscal crisis. In essence, oil revenues initially helped unite warring factions in pursuit of independence, but later created perverse incentives that undermined governance reforms.

The total population of South Sudan was estimated at 11.5 million in 2023, predominantly African cultures that tend to adhere to Christian or animist beliefs. Juba is the capital and largest city of South Sudan. English is the official language, but Arabic and several indigenous languages, including Dinka, Nuer, Bari and Zande, are also widely spoken. The country’s rich ethnic and cultural diversity is reflected in its vibrant traditions, music, art and community practices, which continue to play an essential role in daily life and national identity. In terms of education, only about 35% of adults are literate, reflecting the toll of conflict on education.

South Sudan is a member of several key regional organisations, including the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU). Joining the EAC in 2016 signalled South Sudan’s commitment to regional economic integration, although full integration (for example, under the standard market protocols) is ongoing. These regional ties are viewed as avenues to bolster trade, infrastructure links and peace–aligning with the AU’s Agenda 2063 aspiration for an ‘integrated, prosperous and peaceful’ continent.

This complex backdrop frames South Sudan’s current development trajectory and the potential impact of various sectoral interventions, as explored in the sections that follow.

Chart 2 presents the Current Path of the population structure from 1990 to 2043.

A country’s population characteristics are fundamental to shaping its long-term social and economic trajectory. Demographic factors such as population size, age structure, fertility rates, migration patterns and levels of urbanisation directly influence labour markets, service delivery, governance capacity and social cohesion. 

Analysing South Sudan’s demographic structure is particularly critical, as the country’s youthful population, high fertility rates, widespread displacement and uneven access to education and healthcare present both significant challenges and potential development opportunities. These demographic dynamics provide insight into South Sudan’s development prospects, informing policy choices on human capital investment, economic growth and stability.

South Sudan’s population remains among the youngest in the world, with a median age of just 19.2 years in 2023, compared to the averages of 20.4 and 31.9 years, respectively. This youthful demographic profile reflects persistently high fertility rates and a rapidly growing population, shaped by decades of conflict, limited access to education and healthcare, and constrained economic opportunities. On the Current Path, South Sudan's median age will increase to 25.1 years by 2043.

In 2023, South Sudan had an estimated fertility rate of 3.9 children per woman and a total population of approximately 11.5 million. The working-age population (15–64 years) accounted for 57.6% of the total population, slightly higher than the average of 54.5% observed among low-income countries in Africa. If this working-age population is supported through adequate education and skills development and effectively absorbed into the economy, it has the potential to boost productivity, stimulate economic growth and contribute to the demographic dividend. However, in the absence of sufficient employment opportunities and investment, this potential may remain underutilised, increasing pressure on public services and constraining inclusive economic growth.  

As of 2023, South Sudan’s unemployment rate was estimated at around 12.5%, indicating that roughly 1 in 8 working-age individuals actively seeking employment remained unemployed. This labour market challenge is compounded by the country’s low level of human capital. In the same year, South Sudan ranked last out of 193 countries on the Human Capital Index, with a score of  0.39, reflecting significant constraints in education, skills and health outcomes that limit workforce productivity.

By 2043, the country’s population will grow to approximately 18.2 million. Its average total fertility rate will decline to 3.1 births per woman, far above the 2.1 replacement rate required to maintain population size without immigration. However, South Sudan is significantly impacted by the war in Sudan, especially from a vast and growing number of refugees, which has introduced uncertainty to these forecasts.

South Sudan’s youth bulge (15–29 year-olds as a share of adults) at approximately 47% in 2023 is among the highest globally, often associated with instability if not matched with economic opportunities. On the Current Path, this figure will decline to 36.9% by 2043. In addition to the need for greater spending on education, health services, and job creation, a large number of young adults can drive positive political change in a country through youth activism; however, they can also sow the seeds of socio-political instability in the absence of economic opportunities. 

Children under the age of 15 constitute approximately 39.3% of the total population (significantly higher than the world average of 25.1% in 2023), placing significant pressure on already overstretched public services, particularly in education, health and social protection.  The elderly population aged 65 years and above remains relatively small, accounting for just 3.1% of the population, reflecting lower life expectancy. 

South Sudan’s limited provision of healthcare, combined with widespread poverty, recurrent violence and a high burden of communicable diseases, continues to constrain life expectancy, which remains well below the global average for both men and women. In 2023, life expectancy in South Sudan was estimated at 66.5 years, slightly lower than the African average of 67.3 years and significantly below the global average of 74.2 years in the same year. 

On the Current Path, the proportion of children under 15 years will decline to 33.2% of the total population by 2043, while the share of the elderly aged 65 years and above will more than double, rising to 6.5% compared to 2023. This shift reflects gradual improvements in life expectancy, which will increase to 73.4 years by 2043.

As the population structure evolves, South Sudan will need to prepare for future demands on its social protection and health systems. However, child- and youth-focused investments will remain paramount for the next two decades. The country’s slow demographic transition underscores the need for targeted policy interventions that accelerate fertility declines, improve youth outcomes, and expand opportunities for productive employment. The country’s ability to shift towards a more balanced age structure and unlock a demographic dividend will depend on sustained progress in economic growth and peacebuilding.

When the ratio of the working-age population (15-64 years of age) to dependants (children and the elderly) is 1.7 to one or higher, countries often experience more rapid growth, known as the demographic dividend, provided the workforce is appropriately skilled and absorbed into the labour market. In 2023, South Sudan’s ratio of working-age persons to dependants was 1.4 to one. On the Current Path, South Sudan is likely to only enter a potential demographic window of opportunity around 2053.

Chart 3 presents a population distribution map for 2023.

South Sudan’s population is relatively low in density, but settlement patterns are highly uneven, with the highest concentrations in and around major urban centres such as Juba, the capital. Much of the country’s territory remains sparsely populated due to ongoing challenges related to conflict, displacement and environmental constraints, including seasonal flooding and limited infrastructure. 

In 2023, population density was 0.18 people per hectare, well below the averages for low-income African countries (0.46) and the continent (0.50). This distribution reflects the effects of humanitarian pressures and slow urbanisation linked to protracted insecurity and repeated population movements. These factors continue to shape settlement patterns in South Sudan, reinforcing the concentration of people in areas that are accessible and relatively secure.

Chart 4 presents the urban and rural population in the Current Path, from 1990 to 2043.

South Sudan’s urbanisation rate is very low; the population is mainly rural, at 79.5% in 2023, above the averages of 67.3% and 55.7% for low-income African countries and Africa, respectively. This makes the country one of the least urbanised in the Horn, East and Central Africa (HECA) region. This persistent rural majority reflects limited structural transformation and slow urbanisation, in contrast to the broader trends across low-income African countries. Between 1990 and 2023, the rural share of South Sudan’s population declined by just 7.2 percentage points, a far slower shift than the 12.4 percentage point drop seen on average among its income peers. 

On the Current Path, the rural population is only expected to decline by approximately 0.2 percentage points to 79.4% by 2043. This means the urbanisation rate only marginally increases from about 20.5% in 2023 to 20.6% by 2043. Thus, South Sudan will remain largely rural across the Current Path forecast horizon.

The predominance of the rural population has important implications for South Sudan’s development strategy and the allocation of public investment. It underscores the need to prioritise rural livelihoods, agricultural transformation and the expansion of basic service delivery beyond urban centres. Key interventions will include strengthening rural infrastructure (particularly roads, irrigation and market connectivity), supporting productive and climate-resilient agriculture, and scaling up education and health services in underserved areas. In the absence of faster urbanisation and structural transformation, a sustained focus on rural development will remain essential to promote inclusive growth, enhance human capital and accelerate poverty reduction.

In addition to forced urban migration driven by armed conflict and its effects, rural-to-urban migration is driven by the search for employment opportunities and education, as well as 'push factors' such as poverty, food insecurity, crop failure, land shortage and lack of cattle.

With proper planning, urbanisation can play a pivotal role in driving economic growth and development by accelerating the provision of a range of services (e.g., education and health), fostering entrepreneurship and boosting productivity. In addition, adequate and appropriate urban planning is essential to mitigate the impacts of climate change, such as flooding.

However, if poorly managed, urbanisation can exacerbate structural challenges, fueling unemployment, urban poverty and rising demand for health services, sanitation and housing. It can also accelerate the growth of informal settlements and contribute to environmental degradation. In South Sudan, these risks are already evident: in 2022, an estimated 94% of urban residents lived in slums.

Chart 5 presents GDP in market exchange rates (MER) and growth rate in the Current Path from 1990 to 2043.

South Sudan’s economy remains heavily dependent on oil production and continues to be constrained by political instability and the enduring legacy of conflict. As a result, the country has experienced a highly volatile growth path since independence. In 2023, GDP at market exchange rates (MER) was estimated at US$7.2 billion, marking a strong rebound from the severe contraction during the civil conflict. In 2017, GDP fell to US$1.3 billion, reflecting the scale of economic disruption between 2013 and 2018.

The country’s GDP growth rate over the past decades has alternated between deep recessions and rapid expansions, driven by conflict-related shocks, intermittent oil production shutdowns and intermittent peace efforts. Between 2019 and 2023, the country experienced relatively rapid economic growth, averaging 23.8% per annum.  

This recovery is linked to improved security following the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement and the gradual reactivation of oil exports, which account for the majority of government revenue and export earnings. While the post-2018 period saw a return to positive growth, the country still faces significant challenges in consolidating these gains. In 2023, South Sudan’s real GDP growth rate was negative, underscoring persistent structural weaknesses, including limited economic diversification, weak infrastructure and ongoing humanitarian needs.

Oil exports account for approximately 90% of government revenue and a significant share of the country's GDP. Revenues are shared with Sudan through pipeline and transit agreements. However, the country’s reliance on oil exposes it to fluctuations in global prices and disruptions in production due to insecurity.

To reduce vulnerability to oil price shocks and production disruptions, the government is pursuing a diversification agenda centred on agriculture, fisheries, forestry and the expansion of small-scale manufacturing and value addition. With vast arable land, water resources, and a youthful population, South Sudan has significant development potential if peace and stability are maintained. However, realising this potential will require overcoming significant structural constraints, including severe infrastructure gaps, persistent food insecurity and ongoing political fragility. South Sudan’s natural resource endowment, strong social resilience and ongoing peace efforts position it for gradual economic transformation toward a more stable and prosperous future. 

Looking ahead on the Current Path, South Sudan is forecast to maintain moderate GDP growth averaging around 4.1% per annum between 2027 and 2043, but the outlook is contingent on continued political stability. The country’s GDP will reach US$12.8 billion by 2043, below the average expected for low-income countries in Africa. This underscores the need for targeted policies to foster private-sector-led growth, enhance agricultural productivity, and improve infrastructure resilience.

Chart 6 presents the size of the informal economy as per cent of GDP and per cent of total labour (non-agriculture), from 2020 to 2043. The data used in our modelling are essentially estimates and may therefore differ from other sources. 

The informal economy comprises activities that have market value and would add to tax revenue and GDP if they were recorded. Countries with high informality face a host of development challenges, including low revenue mobilisation, higher poverty, lower per capita incomes, greater inequality and weaker productivity investment. Therefore, high levels of informality tend to constrain economic growth but often serve as a survival sector in poor countries.

In South Sudan, informal economic activities are more than just a means of survival; they are central to the lives of South Sudanese people. They also reflect quiet determination and strong community organisation. Because formal institutions are often weak or unstable, markets, trade routes and small farming or service businesses become spaces where communities manage their own affairs and support one another. Through these activities, people also show resistance by building independence from armed groups and exploitative authorities.

In many regions of South Sudan, people avoid high taxes imposed by the government, form mutual support groups and establish informal cooperatives to maintain trade. These actions have helped limit elite control and protect people’s independence in daily lives. In South Sudan, the informal sector has also helped rebuild relationships between divided communities. Traders, transport workers and producers from diverse ethnic groups often rely on one another, fostering trust through mutual exchange.

Despite its importance, South Sudan's informal sector has experienced a slight decline in its share of GDP over time. In 2023, the informal economy accounted for approximately 34% of South Sudan's GDP, down from about 35.5% in 2020. Despite this reduction, South Sudan's informal economy remains above the 2023 averages of 31.9% for low-income countries in Africa and 26.9% for the continent as a whole. 

With nearly 80% of South Sudanese residing in rural areas and relying on subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods, the informal economy has helped South Sudan reduce extreme poverty. In 2023, an estimated 63.1% of the total labour force (non-agriculture) was informally employed, and women constituted 51% of the total labour force in the informal economy. 

The informal sector’s share of GDP will further decline to 31% by 2043, and informal employment to 59.1%. This suggests a slow but steady shift in the economy's structure. Productivity in informal work remains substantially lower than in the formal sector, as evidenced by the wide gap between the informal share of employment and its contribution to GDP. High informality under the Current Path underscores the need to improve the business climate and develop skills to transition workers into the formal sector.

While the informal economy provides an important safety net for South Sudan’s large and growing working-age population, it also hinders productivity growth, weakens the tax base and complicates the implementation of effective economic policies. Reducing informality would enable more workers to access better wages, stronger protections and the benefits of redistribution. South Sudan, therefore, needs to shrink the informal economy with minimal disruption by lowering barriers to business registration, tackling corruption and expanding access to education and finance.

Without such reforms, the informal sector is likely to remain a significant component of South Sudan’s non-agricultural labour market for the foreseeable future.

Chart 7 presents GDP per capita in the Current Path, from 1990 to 2043, compared with the average for the Africa income group.

In 2014, South Sudan was reclassified from lower-middle-income to low-income status after a steep decline in GNI per capita (Atlas method), the indicator used by the World Bank for income group classification. Over the same period, GDP per capita (PPP) dropped from about US$2 697 in 2011 to roughly US$1 557 in 2014, highlighting the scale of the contraction. Since then, South Sudan has remained a low-income economy, reflecting persistently weak per capita income and ongoing macroeconomic fragility. This reclassification demonstrates the country’s prolonged political challenges and the disruption of its main growth and revenue base, the oil sector, which continues to dominate exports and fiscal resources.

In 2023, GDP per capita in South Sudan stood at about US$1 476, slightly below the African low-income group average of around US$1 879. Looking ahead, the Current Path forecasts that South Sudan’s GDP per capita will increase to US$1 940 by 2043. This recovery remains lower than that of the income peers group, whose average GDP per capita will nearly double to US$2 985 by 2043. 

The widening divergence highlights the ongoing constraints facing South Sudan, including limited economic diversification, weak institutions and the slow pace of structural reforms. Without more effective measures to address these constraints—such as improving fiscal management, promoting private-sector-led growth, and fostering greater political stability—South Sudan is likely to continue lagging behind its income peers in broad-based improvements in living standards.

Chart 8 presents the rate and number of poor people in the Current Path from 2020 to 2043.

In 2022, the World Bank updated the poverty lines to 2017 constant dollar values as follows: 

• The previous US$1.90 extreme poverty line is now set at US$2.15, also for use with low-income countries.
• US$3.20 for lower-middle-income countries, now US$3.65 in 2017 values.
• US$5.50 for upper-middle-income countries, now US$6.85 in 2017 values.
• US$22.70 for high-income countries. The Bank has not yet announced the new poverty line in 2017 US$ prices for high-income countries.

As a low-income country, South Sudan uses the international monetary poverty line of US$2.15 per person per day. Using this benchmark, the country’s poverty rate was 64.3% in 2023—equivalent to roughly 5.9 million people—well above the average rate of around 45% for low-income African countries. On the Current Path, poverty will rise to 81.4% by 2030 and then decline to 73.2% by 2043.  Although the rate will decrease from 2030, the absolute number of South Sudanese living in extreme poverty will increase from 9.8 million in 2030 to 11.1 million by 2043 as the population grows. 

On its current development trajectory, South Sudan is likely to struggle to reduce poverty due to a combination of prolonged conflict and insecurity, weak economic performance, limited job creation and heavy dependence on subsistence livelihoods and humanitarian support. These pressures are compounded by high inflation, macroeconomic instability and disruptions to markets and basic services, which constrain household incomes and undermine resilience. According to the  Global Inequality Update 2024, published by the World Inequality Lab, the top 10% of the South Sudanese population capture over 62% of the country's wealth. In contrast, the bottom 50% of the population captured less than 5% of South Sudan's national income. This implies that growth alone, without inclusive targeted policies, will not address poverty and inequality.

Monetary poverty provides only a partial view of the situation. The global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) offers a broader perspective by assessing acute poverty through overlapping deprivations across 10 indicators, divided into three equally weighted dimensions: health, education and standard of living. The MPI complements the international poverty line of US$2.15 a day by identifying who is multidimensionally poor and by showing the composition of multidimensional poverty. The headcount or incidence of multidimensional poverty is often several percentage points higher than that of monetary poverty. This implies that individuals living above the monetary poverty line may still suffer from deprivations in health, education, and/or the standard of living.

According to the 2022 Global MPI report, 91.9% of the population in South Sudan was multidimensionally poor in 2010, with an additional 6.3% classified as vulnerable to multidimensional poverty, compared to the international monetary poverty rate of 35.8% at US$2.15 per day in the same year.

Chart 9 depicts the National Development Plan of South Sudan.

South Sudan's national development plan has evolved over several years to address shifting economic, political and social challenges. The first national development plan, the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) 2011–2013, was effective immediately after independence (2011). It was primarily a state-building and service-delivery framework, aimed at laying the foundations for governance, economic recovery and human development in the new country. Its organising logic was structured around four pillars: governance, economic development, social and human development, and conflict prevention and security. The plan also emphasised building national systems for budgeting, implementation and monitoring and evaluation—recognising institutional weakness as a key constraint.

The 2013 conflict and subsequent instability fundamentally reshaped national development planning. As violence intensified and displacement expanded, planning priorities shifted away from long-term development and toward stabilisation, emergency service delivery and humanitarian response.

Against the backdrop of the protracted conflict and the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement, South Sudan adopted the National Development Strategy (NDS) 2021–2024 in late 2018. The strategy centred on consolidating peace, restoring basic services and supporting economic recovery in a context of continued fragility. It also sought to align national priorities with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and the African Union’s Agenda 2063, consistent with development planning trends in other low-income and conflict-affected settings. Additionally, the NDS served as a platform for donor coordination and institutional strengthening.

In September 2025, the government unveiled the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) 2026–2036, marking a clear shift from shorter planning cycles to a 10-year national development framework. Reporting around the launch frames the SSDP as a structured roadmap aimed at stability, resilience and sustainable development. However, with national elections on the horizon (postponed to 2027 under the peace agreement) and the SSDP just launched, South Sudan has a narrow window to solidify peace and chart a new course.

Chart 29 presents GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) in the Current Path and each of the eight sectoral scenarios. The data is from 2020 with a forecast to 2043.

The Combined scenario combines all eight sectoral scenarios: Governance, Demographics and Health, Education, Large Infrastructure and Leapfrogging, Agriculture, Manufacturing and Leapfrogging, AfCFTA, and Financial Flows. The integrated nature of the forecasting model means that these sectoral scenarios produce a synergistic or additional effect that further improves outcomes.

In the Combined scenario, GDP per capita in South Sudan will be 46.7% above the Current Path in 2043, equivalent to an additional US$907 per person.

Among the eight sectoral scenarios, the AfCFTA scenario has the most considerable impact on GDP per capita (an increase of 9.1% or US$177 per person over baseline), followed by the Manufacturing scenario (6.7%), infrastructure development (5.6%) and better governance (5.2%). Health (2.1%) and Education (2.1%) reforms, while vital, yield smaller income gains by 2043, suggesting that human capital pays off more gradually.

Chart 30 presents poverty in the Current Path and for each scenario, from 2020 to 2043. The user can select the number of impoverished people or the percentage of the population.

Using the World Bank’s low-income poverty line (US$2.15 per person per day), an estimated 7.4 million South Sudanese (64.3% of the population) lived in extreme poverty in 2023. On the Current Path, this figure will rise to 13.3 million by 2043, equivalent to 73.2% of the population. 

All scenarios reduce poverty compared to the Current Path, but AfCFTA will again deliver the most considerable single-sector poverty reduction by 2043. By expanding export-led growth, AfCFTA helps diversify away from oil, creating jobs in agriculture and manufacturing that lift many out of extreme poverty. In the AfCFTA scenario, the poverty rate will fall to 69.5% by 2043, representing about 68 000 fewer people living in poverty compared with the Current Path. 

The Governance (about 58 000 fewer people in poverty), Manufacturing (about 55 000 fewer) and Agriculture scenarios (about 52 000 fewer) also make meaningful reductions in poverty. Improved governance enhances the efficient allocation of public resources and the delivery of services to households; growth in manufacturing increases labour demand, productivity, and access to wage jobs; and agricultural expansion raises smallholder incomes while easing food prices. 

These scenarios are followed by Large Infrastructure and Leapfrogging, Education, Demographics and Health and Financial Flows, respectively. Together, these channels convert productivity gains and more effective market functioning into sustained reductions in poverty over time.

Chart 31 presents GDP in the Current Path and in the Combined scenario from 2020 to 2043. The data is in US$ 2017 and at market exchange rates (MER).

The Combined scenario combines all eight sectoral scenarios: Governance, Demographics and Health, Education, Large Infrastructure and Leapfrogging, Agriculture, Manufacturing, AfCFTA and Financial Flows. 

After more than a decade of volatile growth marked by conflict, oil dependence and repeated economic shocks, South Sudan’s GDP stood at US$7.2 billion in 2023. On the Current Path, it will increase to US$12.8 billion by 2043, with an average annual growth rate of 4.1% during the forecast period (2027-2043). In the Combined scenario, GDP will reach US$22.3 billion by 2043, roughly US$9.5 billion more than the Current Path. Under this scenario, the average GDP growth rate will nearly double to 7.5% per annum.

While this would represent a significant improvement in South Sudan’s economic prospects, it would not by itself eliminate the country’s structural challenges, rampant poverty and vulnerability, given the scale of development deficits and the long-term nature of recovery and state-building.

Chart 32 presents GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) in the Current Path and the Combined scenario. The data is from 2023 with a forecast to 2043.

South Sudan’s GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) will increase from US$1 476 in 2023 to US$1 941 by 2043 on the Current Path. In the Combined scenario, it will rise to US$2 849, about US$907 above the Current Path, accelerating convergence with peer countries. Reaching this outcome depends on implementing reforms across multiple sectors, including Demographics and Health, Education, Manufacturing, Large Infrastructure and Leapfrogging, Agriculture, AfCFTA, Financial Flows and Governance.

Chart 33 presents the value-added by sector in the Current Path and in the Combined scenario, for 2023 and 2043. The data is in US$ 2017 and as a percentage of GDP.

In the Combined scenario, the economy shifts away from the Current Path and towards a more balanced, productivity-led pattern of structural change. By 2043, the ICT sector's value-added share of GDP will rise to 11.7%, 5.9 percentage points above the Current Path of 5.6%. This increase reflects a transparent redirection of investment, skills development and entrepreneurship into higher-productivity activities with economy-wide benefits.

The ICT strengthens total factor productivity by reducing transaction and information costs, improving market coordination, and helping firms upgrade their production and delivery processes. As connectivity, digital services and tech-enabled business models expand, they boost productivity not only within the sector but also across agriculture, services and light manufacturing through digital payments, logistics platforms, market information and more efficient public and private service delivery. Over time, network effects and learning-by-doing reinforce these gains, positioning ICT as a general-purpose capability that speeds up structural transformation beyond what sector growth alone would imply.

Modest gains are also recorded in services (+0.9 percentage points) and materials, including mining (+0.3 percentage points), pointing to a gradual diversification of economic activity away from traditional low-productivity sectors. The expanded role of services aligns with the process of structural transformation: as incomes rise, urbanisation accelerates, and firms become more active, demand increasingly shifts toward transport, trade, finance, communications and other business services that support productive activity across the economy.

In absolute terms, output will rise across all sectors, underscoring how stronger industrial momentum generates economy-wide spillovers rather than isolated gains. By 2043, services will deliver the largest increase, contributing US$5.6 billion more than in the Current Path. The next-largest gains come from ICT (US$1.9 billion) and manufacturing (US$1.0 billion), followed by agriculture (US$0.6 billion), materials (US$0.3 billion) and energy (US$0.2 billion).

Chart 34 presents the size of the informal sector in the Current Path and in the Combined scenario, from 2020 to 2043.

The informal sector operates outside formal regulatory frameworks, with many enterprises avoiding or unable to meet tax obligations, thereby reducing government revenue. The industry also generally does not adhere to the country’s labour laws.

The sector generates income for individuals who lack access to formal job opportunities, including youth, women and unskilled workers. Productivity in the industry is generally lower than in the formal sector due to limited access to modern technology, credit and markets.

South Sudan’s informal economy plays a critical role as a source of livelihoods, particularly in urban centres and peri-urban settlements where formal employment opportunities are scarce and public-sector jobs are limited. While informal activities provide essential income for many households through petty trade, small services, transport and casual labour, they are typically associated with low productivity, limited access to finance and markets, weak regulation and little or no social protection. Informal workers and businesses are also highly exposed to insecurity, price volatility and climate-related shocks.

As South Sudan aims to diversify beyond oil and build a more resilient, jobs-rich economy, expanding the formal private sector and improving the quality of work are central to achieving inclusive and sustainable growth. This requires measures that lower the costs of formalisation, strengthen basic infrastructure and market access, improve skills and business support, and create a more predictable regulatory and security environment—so that formal enterprises can grow, generate better jobs and contribute more fully to the tax base and service delivery.

On the Current Path, informality will remain widespread in South Sudan, with the informal sector accounting for a significant share of economic activity and employment. In 2023, the informal sector accounted for 34% of GDP and 63% of total labour in South Sudan. This reflects a narrow formal job base, slow expansion of higher-productivity sectors outside oil, and longstanding barriers to enterprise growth and formalisation, especially for youth, women and micro and small businesses. 

On the Current Path, South Sudan’s informal sector will decline only marginally, accounting for about 31% of GDP by 2043, while the share of informal employment will fall to 59% of the total labour force.

By contrast, the Combined scenario presents a more favourable trajectory. With reforms implemented together (improving governance and stability, expanding education and health outcomes, investing in infrastructure and accelerating diversification), more firms can grow, productivity will rise and formal employment will expand. As a result, the informal sector’s contribution to GDP and the share of workers in informal jobs will decline to 25.5% of GDP and 36.8% of total labour by 2043, signalling a gradual shift toward more productive, better-protected and more sustainable livelihoods.

Chart 35 presents poverty in the Current Path and the Combined scenario, for 2023 and 2043.

In the Combined scenario, South Sudan will achieve far greater reductions in extreme poverty (at US$2.15) than on the Current Path. By 2043, the extreme poverty rate will fall from 73.2% to 49.2%, lifting an additional estimated 4.5 million people out of extreme poverty. This substantial improvement reflects the compounded impact of coordinated interventions implemented across multiple sectors, which together expand labour market opportunities and increase household incomes.

Unlike stand-alone measures, the Combined scenario tackles both the root causes and the effects of poverty. Strengthening human capital improves employability and raises incomes; accelerating structural transformation in agriculture and manufacturing creates more formal, productive jobs; and investments in infrastructure and digital connectivity broaden access to markets and essential services. Together, these reforms also build state capacity to provide targeted assistance and stronger social safety nets for the most vulnerable, helping to ensure the gains from growth are shared more widely.

Alongside poverty reduction, the Combined scenario will also deliver meaningful progress in reducing income inequality. On the Current Path, South Sudan’s Gini coefficient (a standard measure of income distribution where 0 indicates perfect equality and 1 indicates extreme inequality) will decline only marginally from 0.43 in 2023 to 0.42 by 2043. In the Combined scenario, however, the Gini will fall to 0.36 by 2043, about 0.06 lower than in the Current Path. This improvement points to a more inclusive distribution of economic gains over time.

Chart 36 compares life expectancy in the Current Path with the Combined scenario from 2020 to 2043.

Life expectancy at birth is one of the most comprehensive indicators of health and overall well-being, and it helps illustrate the substantial drag that weak human capital places on South Sudan’s economic growth. It is heavily influenced by deaths at young ages and from preventable causes.

In 2023, life expectancy in South Sudan was estimated at 66.5 years. On the Current Path, it will increase to 73.4 years by 2043, with male life expectancy reaching 71.1 years and female life expectancy reaching 75.6 years. 

In the Combined scenario, South Sudan's life expectancy will increase to 76.9 years by 2043, with male life expectancy reaching 74.8 years and female life expectancy reaching 78.9 years. The increase of 3.5 years reflects not only improvements in the healthcare system, but also broader gains in education, infrastructure, governance and socio-economic equity.

Chart 37 compares carbon emissions in the Current Path with the Combined scenario from 2020 to 2043. Note that the data is in million tons of carbon, not CO2 equivalent.

For more insights, also refer to the Climate theme. 

South Sudan is a minor contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions in absolute terms, with most emissions linked to land-use change and forestry, widespread biomass-based energy use (fuelwood and charcoal), and production occurring in oil-sector operations and associated transport and power generation.

In 2023, South Sudan emitted about 970 000 tons of carbon, accounting for just around 0.2% of Africa’s total carbon emissions that year. On the Current Path, South Sudan’s emissions are forecast to rise gradually to 2.9 million tons of carbon by 2043. This trajectory will be driven mainly by population and energy demand growth, urbanisation and expansion of economic activity, especially if electrification continues to rely on diesel generation and traditional biomass remains the dominant household fuel. 

In the Combined scenario, South Sudan’s carbon emissions will rise to 5.0 million tons by 2043, which is approximately 2.1 million tons above the Current Path forecast. This depicts increased economic activities under the AfCFTA, Manufacturing, Governance, Agriculture, and Large Infrastructure and Leapfrogging scenarios. In the AfCFTA scenario alone, emissions rise to 3.1 million tons, reflecting higher trade and production activity. Given South Sudan’s high vulnerability to climate risks, including floods, droughts and shifting rainfall patterns, policy responses should prioritise adaptation and resilience alongside mitigation.

Chart 38 compares energy demand and production in the Current Path with the Combined scenario from 2020 to 2043. 

Energy production is done in nine types, namely oil, gas, coal, hydro, nuclear, solar, wind, geothermal and other renewables. The data is converted into billion barrels of oil equivalent (BBOE) to facilitate comparisons. Note that energy production could be for domestic use or for export. The data is converted into billion or million barrels of oil equivalent (BBOE or MBOE) to allow for comparisons between different energy sources.

South Sudan’s energy sector is starting a slow, policy-led transition focused on expanding electricity access, strengthening energy security and reducing reliance on expensive diesel generation and traditional biomass. The Ministry of Energy and Dams (MoED) has set out a vision for affordable, reliable and sustainable power, prioritising the scaling up of renewable energy and a shift toward cleaner sources, alongside longer-term ambitions to develop the country’s hydropower potential.

At the same time, the enabling environment remains challenging. South Sudan has extremely low electrification and continues to rely heavily on imported diesel for electricity generation and on biomass for energy, which constrains productivity and raises household and business costs. Assessments also highlight persistent weaknesses in the power-sector policy and institutional framework, including limited capacity and overlapping mandates. These constraints point to the need for more precise regulation and stronger institutions to attract private investment and accelerate the deployment of modern energy solutions.

As of 2023, South Sudan's energy production was mainly oil, accounting for 97.4%, with the remainder consisting of biofuels and waste. On the Current Path, these will remain the country’s primary energy sources by 2043. However, renewable energy production, particularly from solar, will be gradually increasing, though from a very low base. Solar lanterns, solar lighting systems, solar home systems and small mini-grids are becoming more visible in urban markets and in some communities, offering one of the most practical near-term pathways to scale electricity access beyond the grid.

In 2023, South Sudan's estimated energy production was around 35.4 million barrels of oil equivalent (BOE), surpassing the domestic energy demand of approximately 16.3 million BOE. As a result, the country became a net energy exporter, a trend expected to continue through 2043. Energy demand will increase to 31.3 million BOE by 2043, while production will rise to 49.6 million BOE, which suggests a gross surplus of about 18.3 million BOE. However, in 2043, exports will reach around 26.8 million BOE, indicating that a significant portion of production will continue to be directed toward international markets rather than domestic consumption.

In the Combined scenario, energy demand will rise to about 41.6 million BOE by 2043, roughly 10.3 million BOE above the Current Path. Over the same period, production will increase to 52.2 million BOE, around 5.1% above the Current Path. As a result, the energy surplus will narrow to roughly 10.6 million BOE, a 42% reduction relative to the Current Path. Consistent with stronger domestic absorption, energy exports will also decline to 23.9 million BOE, down by nearly 2.9 million BOE (10.7%) from the Current Path in 2043.

Chart 39 summarises the policy recommendations for South Sudan. 

This report provides a scenario-based analysis of South Sudan’s development trajectory from 2023 to 2043, to assess the effects of both sector-specific reforms and a package of combined interventions. The scenarios cover governance, education, demographics and health, agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure and digital leapfrogging, financial flows, and trade integration through the AfCFTA. Results are presented against a Current Path baseline, which assumes the continuation of recent trends and existing policies. They are compared with alternative sectoral scenarios and a Combined scenario that captures the cumulative impact of reforms implemented together.

On the Current Path, South Sudan will experience only gradual improvements in living standards, supported by slow gains in health and education. Despite this progress, poverty will remain widespread, informality will continue to dominate employment, and advances in governance and service delivery will be limited. Energy access will expand at a modest pace but will remain constrained by high costs and inadequate infrastructure.

The Combined scenario offers a more transformative and inclusive development pathway. Living standards will rise faster, while poverty and inequality will decline more sharply, indicating a more widely shared growth. Coordinated investments in agriculture, education, health and infrastructure will strengthen human capital and improve well-being. The economy will become more diversified, with stronger productivity growth in agriculture and a growing role for manufacturing, supporting job creation beyond the oil sector. Informal employment will decline as the public and private sectors expand. At the same time, faster growth can raise emissions and environmental pressures, reinforcing the need to pair economic transformation with cleaner energy, sustainable land use and climate adaptation.

South Sudan is entering a critical phase of its development. Since independence, conflict, displacement, macroeconomic instability and heavy reliance on oil have weakened institutions and slowed structural transformation. Yet, the country has significant opportunities, from fertile agricultural land to regional markets, if stability, governance and fundamental economic enablers improve. This report shows that while the Current Path delivers gradual progress, it is unlikely to meet the scale of South Sudan’s development needs or the targets of its forthcoming Development Plan (SSDP 2026–2036). By contrast, the Combined scenario illustrates that with aligned, cross-sector reforms, the country can accelerate progress toward the SDGs and Agenda 2063 goals of ending extreme poverty and hunger while ensuring healthy, educated lives. Crucially, the analysis highlights that achieving meaningful transformation requires a systems-based approach, effective institutional alignment and sustained policy coherence over the long term.

To unlock the full potential of the Combined scenario, South Sudan should:

• Accelerate structural transformation and economic diversification beyond oil by raising agricultural productivity and building agro-processing and light manufacturing. Prioritise feeder roads, storage and irrigation where feasible. Ensure quality inputs, extension services, and targeted support to MSMEs to shift their activities toward higher-value-added production and formal job creation.
• Leverage regional integration and the AfCFTA to expand market access and diversify exports. Focus on trade logistics (roads, border infrastructure, cold chains), customs modernisation, standards and certification, and trade finance—especially for small firms and women-owned enterprises—to integrate into regional value chains.
• Invest in human capital at scale through reforms in basic education, skills development and primary healthcare. Expand TVET and market-relevant training (including for youth and women), improve learning outcomes and strengthen maternal and child health, nutrition and disease prevention to raise productivity and lifetime earnings.
• Strengthen governance, stability and state capability by improving public sector effectiveness, transparency and policy credibility. Prioritise citizen-facing service delivery, predictable rules for business and stronger accountability in resource management to build trust and attract investment.
• Expand reliable, affordable energy while keeping development low-carbon where possible by scaling solar (including mini-grids and off-grid solutions), improving the efficiency of diesel generation where it remains necessary, and promoting clean cooking to reduce biomass dependence. Align energy expansion with productive uses (agro-processing, SMEs) to maximise job and income impacts.
• Improve domestic revenue mobilisation by strengthening tax administration, reducing leakages and improving budget credibility. Enhance resource governance and curb illicit financial flows so that public revenues translate into visible development outcomes.
• Embed climate adaptation and disaster risk management in core development planning, given South Sudan’s exposure to floods, droughts and rainfall variability. Invest in climate-smart agriculture, resilient infrastructure, early warning systems and risk-informed land and water management.
• Improve coordination and implementation capacity by aligning national plans with actionable sector strategies, strengthening inter-ministerial delivery mechanisms, and investing in data systems and monitoring frameworks to track results and adapt policies over time.

Overall, the scenarios underscore a central message: South Sudan can achieve faster, more inclusive and more resilient development if reforms are integrated across sectors and backed by credible institutions. Realising this potential will require long-term policy coherence, disciplined implementation and sustained investment in human, institutional and physical capital.