FOCAC recycled: preferential access, same old problem
Tariffs fall, but structure remains; without industrialisation, Africa-China trade imbalances will persist
Since the establishment of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, Africa-China trade has expanded dramatically, from less than US$10 billion to over US$348 billion in 2025. Yet beneath this growth lies a persistent structural imbalance. Africa’s trade deficit with China has widened from negligible levels in the early 2000s to over US$100 billion in 2025, with South Africa, China’s largest trading partner on the continent, accounting for more than 11% of this deficit.
This reflects a recurring pattern in which Africa primarily exports unprocessed raw materials while importing higher-value manufactured goods from China. In 2024, trade with China constituted over 60% of Africa's total trade deficit, underscoring the scale of this asymmetry.
At the 2024 FOCAC summit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa publicly raised concerns about this imbalance, sparking renewed debate about the sustainability of Africa–China trade relations. In what appears to be a strategic response, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced in February 2026 that China would grant 100% duty-free access to imports from all African countries, effective 1 May 2026. The offer excludes Eswatini, the only African country that is not a member of FOCAC.
At face value, China’s duty-free initiative presents a substantial opportunity for export growth. It also comes at a critical geopolitical moment. With the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) uncertain and tensions between South Africa and the United States (US) rising, China is positioning itself as a mutual trade partner. The offer of duty-free access is therefore not only economically beneficial but also geopolitically significant, as it represents an attempt to consolidate influence in Africa amid shifting global alliances.
China’s duty-free access offer is not only economic, but also geopolitical: an attempt to consolidate influence in Africa amid shifting global alliances
However, preferential access alone is unlikely to resolve the structural constraints underpinning Africa’s trade deficit with China. Three interrelated challenges stand out. First, non-tariff barriers remain significant. Second, export composition remains narrow and low value-added. Third, participation in trade value chains is limited.
Duty-free access does not eliminate the regulatory and technical hurdles associated with entering the Chinese market. African exporters must still meet stringent standards related to quality, safety and certification. For many countries, especially those reliant on small-scale producers, meeting these requirements can be challenging without targeted support. As a result, market access remains uneven in practice, favouring exporters with the capacity to comply.
For the initiative to meaningfully shift the trade balance, African exports must diversify beyond not only minerals but also raw and unprocessed goods. While there is growing interest in expanding agricultural exports (including from smallholder farmers), much of this trade continues to consist of cash crops destined for processing in China. Without domestic agro-processing capacity, Africa risks reinforcing the very commodity dependence that underpins the current imbalance.
Africa–China trade is not simply a matter of exports and imports; it is also shaped by who controls production and distribution. In many cases, particularly in extractive industries, Chinese investors dominate export channels. This limits the extent to which African governments can capture value beyond royalties and taxes. Without deeper integration of local firms into these value chains, the benefits of expanded trade will remain constrained.
Taken together, these factors indicate that China’s duty-free initiative may disproportionately benefit existing players, many of whom are already embedded in Chinese-led value chains. Additionally, Chinese investors operating in Africa are better positioned to navigate regulatory and technical requirements, leverage established networks, and respond to demand in the Chinese market.
In this context, the initiative is likely to stimulate Chinese investment in Africa’s agricultural cash commodities, such as sesame, cashews, tobacco, tea, cocoa, coffee beans, hides and fruits, while deepening engagement in mineral resources. Although such investment could boost exports at intensive margins, it also risks entrenching the existing trade pattern in which value addition occurs elsewhere. As a result, higher trade volumes may not translate into more inclusive or structurally transformative outcomes for African economies.
The core issue is not tariffs, but industrialisation. Africa’s trade position will only shift when it exports more manufactured and semi-processed goods. This depends on coherent industrial policies that support mineral beneficiation and value addition, agro-processing and agro-industrialisation, and green industrialisation.
These are long-term processes that require intensive capital, infrastructure development, particularly in energy and transport, and institutional capacity: areas where many African countries continue to face significant constraints.
By the time African countries develop the industrial capacity needed to fully leverage duty-free access, the global trade environment may have shifted. The experience with AGOA and China’s recent decision to cut off solar export incentives for Africa shows that preferential trade schemes are inherently uncertain and can be withdrawn or reconfigured. This raises a critical question: is Africa once again celebrating access without adequately preparing for utilisation?
The experience with AGOA and China’s recent decision to cut off solar export incentives for Africa shows that preferential trade schemes are inherently uncertain
Beyond export-side constraints, import dynamics also play a huge role in shaping Africa-China trade outcomes. Thus, strengthening import governance is equally critical. This entails addressing the influx of low-quality imports, illicit trade, and imports that can be produced competitively within Africa. These measures are crucial for protecting domestic industries and addressing structural imbalances in this trade. Yet, despite their urgency, many African governments remain reluctant to implement targeted and protective measures.
All these concerns echo the early years of FOCAC itself. Two and a half decades ago, African governments welcomed expanded engagement with China, but did not fully anticipate the structural implications of the relationship. Today, there is a risk of repeating this pattern, embracing preferential access without addressing underlying structural constraints.
Finally, there is an often-overlooked regional dimension. Greater integration into the Chinese market may inadvertently undermine the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). If African countries prioritise exports to China over intra-African trade, this could slow progress towards regional industrialisation and deepen external dependence. In a volatile global economy, such dependence further exposes African economies to external shocks beyond their control, as illustrated by the current trade disruptions linked to the US–Israel–Iran conflict.
China’s duty-free initiative presents both an opportunity and a test. It expands market access, but highlights the limitations without the capability.
The issue is not exporting more to China, but “exporting smart”, moving from raw commodities to value-added goods
If Africa is to avoid a “FOCAC recycled” scenario, African governments must move beyond market access as an end in itself. The priority should be to build the productive and institutional foundations that enable African economies to compete, diversify and capture value, both within global markets and within the continent.
Image: lenahelfinger/Pixabay
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